A Freedom-Promoting Approach to Property:
A Renewed Tradition for New Debates
Jedediah Purdyt

This should be a heady time for theorists and practitioners of
property law. Some of the most important recent proposals to improve
human wellbeing rest on the expansion or reform of property rights.
From Peru, the political economist Hernando de Soto recently cap-

tured the world's attention by contending that a lack of property
rights stands between the slum dwellers of the world's poor countries
and new horizons of prosperity.' Nearer home, Yale economist Robert
Shiller has proposed a new market in risk, essentially propertizing

present expectations of good fortune, which would represent one of

the most dramatic expansions in the domain of private property since
labor power slipped the bonds of status-based obligation and became
a freely alienable commodity.2 Debates grow hot over whether copyright and patent protection should expand, retract, or take new forms

altogether.' In environmental law, the power of new types of property

t Assistant Professor, Duke University School of Law. A.B., Social Studies, Harvard College; J.D., Yale Law School. In thinking about this Article, I have benefited from conversations
with members of the Political Economy Working Group, particularly David Grewal, Sanjay
Reddy, Christian Barry, and Robert Hockett, and from workshops at the Berkman Center for
Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, where Jonathan Zittrain and John Palfrey were
particularly helpful. I am deeply indebted to James Boyle, Erwin Chemerinsky, John Eden, Jeff
Powell, and Neil Siegel, whose insightful and constructive comments immeasurably improved
earlier versions of this Article. I am grateful to Alexa Chew and John Eden for research assistance. This is the first in an anticipated trilogy of articles on the theme of property and freedom.
1 See generally Hernando de Soto, The Mystery of Capital: Why Capitalism Triumphs in
the West and Fails Everywhere Else (Basic 2000) (arguing that capitalism fails in poor countries
because the poor lack property rights in their assets); Hernando de Soto, The Other Path: The
Economic Answer to Terrorism (Basic 2d ed 2002) (arguing that Peru's poor represent a distinct
entrepreneurial class).
See generally Robert J. Shiller, The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century
2
(Princeton 2003) (proposing a new risk management infrastructure that utilizes financial inventions to insure the gains made by workers). On the freeing of Europe's serfs from feudal bonds,
and the essential relationship of this development to property rights, see David D. Haddock and
Lynne Kiesling, The Black Death and PropertyRights, 31 J Legal Stud 545,551 (2002).
See generally William W. Fisher, III, Promises to Keep: Technology, Law, and the Future
3
of Entertainment (Stanford 2004). See also James Boyle, The New Enclosure Movement and the
Construction of the Public Domain, 66 L & Contemp Probs 33,73 (2003) (analogizing the development of intellectual property rights to the movement to enclose common property in England,
and arguing that today's public domain is unlikely to suffer from the tragedy of the commons);
Jane Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 Colum J L & Arts 61, 65 (2002)
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rights to foster efficient conservation represents the most significant
advance since the passage of the major regulatory acts of the 1970s'4 In
short, it is a time characterized not just by what Michael Heller has
called the "dynamic analytics" of property,5 but also by a dynamic
practice,in which basic reform of property regimes has become a major-and contested -instrument for pursuing all manner of goals.

I have in mind reform that does at least one of the following.
First, it may change the domain of resources subject to property law:
those things that colloquially are called "property." This reform may
involve redefining as property some resource that has not previously
been in the "property" domain at all, such as environmental serviceswhat I refer to as an extension of property rights. Alternatively, the
change in domain may introduce refinements that multiply the set of
possible distinct interests in what has previously been regarded as a
unified resource-what I call an intensification of property rights. 6 I

use the term expansion to encompass both methods of reform.
Second, a dynamic reform may change the criteria of ownership,

so that a new class of owners is created for a propertized resource-as
in the shift from feudal obligation to labor markets, in which people
became by default the owners of their own labor power. Third, such a

reform may change the incidents of ownership: for instance, conferring
the power of alienation and creating market structures (such as contract law) by which property may be enforceably alienated.8 These

(arguing that recent legislation and cases are reaching a "happier balance between the copyright
owner's, the intermediary's, and the end-user's interests ...
to the ultimate enrichment of the public").
4
See James Salzman and J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 Stan L Rev 607,614-16 (2000) (analyzing the role of currency selection in environmental trading markets); Carol M. Rose, The Several Futures of Property:Of Cyberspaceand
Folk Tales Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 Minn L Rev 129, 163-64 (1998) (analyzing environmental rights as "hybrid property" rights).
5
Michael A. Heller, The Dynamic Analytics of Property Law, 2 Theoretical Inquiries
in L
79, 80-82 (2001). Heller proposes a view of property theory, which I adopt, in which conceptual
innovations respond essentially to institutional innovations and political struggles "on the
ground," clarifying the stakes of these developments and sometimes contributing to them by
indicating implicit or overlooked conceptual possibilities. Id at 86-91.
6
The reforms discussed in Part III.B have this character: they bring into the regime of formal
property a set of claims that are now local and possessory. The reforms described in Part III.C are an
instance of refining existing distinctions to make possible a partial exchange of present expectations.
7
See Haddock and Kiesling, 31 J Legal Stud at 551 (cited in note 2). This is also the character of the reforms discussed in Part III.B: to create legally a class of owners who are presently
only possessors.
8
This would be the effect of creating formal markets in personal income expectations,
discussed in Part III.C. It is not clear, however, that in this specific instance legal reforms would
be required to make such markets effective. Perhaps a conceptually clearer example would be
the prohibition on selling oneself into slavery in a free-labor economy-that is, alienating one's
labor power in gross rather than in units of time or production.
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methods are not mutually exclusive, of course, but they are reasonably
analytically distinct
The elevation of property rights as a master term for diagnosing
and solving all manner of problems has given fresh vitality to three
persistent and important critiques of property regimes. The first is an
anticommodification critique resting on the claim that commodification-introducing property regimes to areas previously governed by
other principles -impoverishes our experience of the values at stake
in those areas, tending to produce an instrumental relationship to oth-

ers and to the natural world.'0 The second is an anti-expropriationcri-

tique. The main contention of this line of argument is that the introduction of property rights presents an opportunity for powerful social
groups to expropriate resources that were previously distributed in a
9 My designation of three dimensions of dynamic reform bears some similarity to the
taxonomy developed by Emily Sherwin. See Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-DimensionalProperty Rights, 29 Ariz St L J 1075, 1076-77 (1997) (defining a system of property rights where the
object of property and the conditions of its ownership are determinate as "two-dimensional,"
and a system where the incidents of ownership are also determinate as "three-dimensional"). I
am also indebted to the somewhat different scheme developed by Laura Underkuffler. See
Laura S. Underkuffler, The Idea of Property:Its Meaning and Power 16-33 (Oxford 2003) (distinguishing among (1) the "theory of rights," or incidents of ownership; (2) the spatial dimension-that is, the definition of resources falling within the ambit of ownership; (3) stringency, or
the level of protection given the property right relative to incursions or competing public policy
considerations; and (4) time-that is, the question of at what point the previous three features
attach as to any particular owner, and to what extent they are susceptible to revision in light of
subsequent political (or other collective) judgments).
10 See, for example, Margaret Jane Radin, Conceiving a Code for Creation:The Legal Debate SurroundingHuman Cloning,53 Hastings L J 1123,1126 (2002):
We want the legal system to make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodification of
love, family, and other commitments close to ourselves... Some people think that if we
start talking about children as things we own, and about one as being fungible with the
other, and we expect them to maximize our pleasure in life, we might start actually trading
them one day.
Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 Yale L J 1135, 1146-47
(2000) (arguing that the use of apologies as bargaining chips in settlement negotiation drains a
"moral process" of meaning by making it a "market trade"); Jennifer Fitzgerald, Geneticizing
Disability:The Human Genome Project and the Commodification of the Self, 14 Issues L & Med
147, 151-52 (1998) (arguing that regarding the self as a bundle of alienable resources stunts the
ability to discern noneconomic value in persons); David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity:
The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud 621,655 (1998) (considering the argument that a market in organs will reduce altruism); Norman W. Spaulding, Coinmodification and Its Discontents: Environmentalism and the Promise of Market Incentives, 16
Stan Envir L J 293, 311-13 (1997) (considering the psychological experiences of "commodity
fetishism" and "alienation" as consequences of commodification). See also generally Note, The
Price of Everything, the Value of Nothing: Refraining the Commodification Debate, 117 Harv L
Rev 689 (2003) (surveying arguments concerned with the devaluation of commodified goods and
relationships, and proposing that this devaluation arises less from the designation of the goods as
commodities than from the character of the consequent transactions, in which the fungibility of
values is assumed).
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more egalitarian manner under less formal arrangements." The third
line of argument involves the structureof production.The characteristic claim is that property rights lock a social order into a specific system of productive activity-usually portrayed as hierarchical and substantially involuntary-in which alternatives more friendly to creative
or cooperative endeavor are implicitly suppressed.'2
Theorists and reformers friendly to the expansion of property
rights should be able to provide two kinds of responses to these critiques. First, they should be able to answer the attacks on their own
terms, either by showing that property rights need not have the effects
that critics claim, or by demonstrating that the critical arguments, even
if accurate, lack the normative weight to carry the day. Secondassuming the critical arguments do not fail categorically- property's
proponents should be able to identify the points at which a critique
becomes powerful enough to brake the expansion of property rights;
that is, arguments for property rights should also generate an account
of the proper limits to property rights.
Neither such argument has been forthcoming. Conventional arguments in favor of property rights take two broad forms. The first
rests on the economic efficiency of property rights-their power to
internalize the costs and benefits of an owner's use of a resource and
facilitate the market allocation of resources to their highest-value users (as measured by effective demand).'" Second, they have empha11 See Joel M. Ngugi, Re-Examining the Role of Private Property in Market Democracies:
ProblematicIdeological Issues Raised by Land Registration,25 Mich J Intl L 467, 499-500 (2004)
(arguing that Kenyan land-title reform was driven by opportunistic elites who used the government's reform to create a landed gentry at the expense of peasant farmers); Khiara M. Bridges,
Note, On the Commodification of the Black Female Body: The CriticalImplications of the Alienability of Fetal Tissue, 102 Colum L Rev 123,158-61 (2002) (arguing that black women, because of
economic necessity and internalized oppression, will be uniquely vulnerable to the dehumanization of a market for fetal tissue); Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Conflict
over the Commodification of Life, 22 BC Intl & Comp L Rev 279, 292-93 (1999) (discussing the
benefits Western pharmaceutical companies derive from patents on plants discovered in India,
where comnimodification of such living things runs counter to deeply rooted traditions).
12 See Ngugi, 25 Mich J Intl L at 513-14 (cited in note 11) (arguing that the effect
of Kenyan land-title reform was to mandate the participation of farmers in commodity markets);
Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52
Duke L J 1245, 1247-48, 1254 (2003) (describing how pursuing productivity and growth places a
limit on commitments to "democracy, autonomy, and equality," particularly because of two
modes of making production decisions-the market and the corporate hierarchy); Fitzgerald, 14
Issues L & Med at 157-59 (cited in note 10) (arguing that giving parents the ability to genetically
manage their unborn child will establish relationships where the child is made to serve the whims
of the parents); Spaulding, 16 Stan Envir L J at 314 (cited in note 10) ("Commodification of the
environment, much like commodification in other areas, subordinates individuals and groups
lacking market power.").
13 See, for example, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law
32-34 (Aspen 6th ed
2003) ("Legal' protection of property rights creates incentives to exploit resources efficiently.");
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sized the potential of property rights to secure negative liberty, that is,
to protect their owners from interference by others in their affairs.
More specifically, most such defenses have concentrated on the protection property rights may provide against the state, with scant attention to the issue of interference by other private persons."
These are, of course, powerful arguments. The difficulty is that the

descriptions they provide are entirely consistent with the three objections to property rights identified earlier. Economic efficiency and
negative liberty may seem to anticommodificationist critics of property rights to be the summa of the instrumental, atomistic conception
Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 Yale L J 1315, 1320-21 (1993) (defining the "efficiency thesis" as how "land rules within a close-knit group evolve so as to minimize its members'
costs"). Of course, the influence of economic analysis on legal scholarship has been so powerful
in recent decades that an enormous amount of work on the dynamics of property regimes has
supposed that economic efficiency, secured by the coordinated pursuit of respective self-interest,
is in fact the purpose of private property regimes. See generally Stuart Banner, Transitions Between Property Regimes, 31 J Legal Stud 359 (2002); Haddock and Kiesling, 31 J Legal Stud at
561-62 (cited in note 2) (applying Harold Demsetz's theory, which proposes that social costbenefit analysis predicts when property regimes emerge, to medieval property rights after the
Black Death); Saul Levmore, Two Stories About the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J Legal
Stud 421 (2002) (arguing that the competing stories of efficiency and interest group manipulation undermine normative theories of the extent to which property should be private); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Demsetz Thesis and the Evolution of Property Rights, 31 J Legal Stud 331 (2002)
(outlining Demsetz's theory of property rights evolving toward efficient rules); Henry E. Smith,
Exclusion Versus Governance:Two Strategiesfor DelineatingProperty Rights,31 J Legal Stud 453
(2002).
A view of property regimes that stresses their power to create and undergird markets that, in
turn, lead to efficient allocation of resources and effort, is not necessarily at odds with a view
stressing the priority of freedom in normative evaluations of such regimes. Rather, the question
is whether one takes efficiency to be a complete and final account of what is valuable in property
regimes or, alternatively, understands markets as securing freedom by (1) coordinating activity
voluntarily according to rules that exclude direct coercion, and (2) creating opportunities for
capability-realizing activity that would not otherwise have existed. As will emerge in this Article,
I am highly sympathetic to the second view. See generally Amartya Sen, Markets and Freedoms,
in Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom 501 (Belknap 2002) (analyzing the function of market
mechanisms to promote individual freedoms like decisional autonomy).
For writers in this tradition, property is the keystone of negative liberty, the "guardian of
14
every other right" that gives substance and certainty to the immunity against interference. See
James W Ely, The Guardian of Every Other Right:A ConstitutionalHistory of Property Rights 26
(Oxford 1998) (describing how "the protection of property ownership was an integral part of the
American effort to fashion constitutional limits on governmental authority"). See also generally
Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (Knopf 1999) (arguing that property is a necessary prerequisite for political liberty); Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Eminent Domain (Harvard 1985) (arguing in favor of an absolutist conception of property rights, where such
rights include exclusive use, disposition, and full alienability).
15
Isaiah Berlin's portrait of negative liberty concerned the kind of dignity and personality
one might hope to attain when one enjoys protection from interference by the state, private
institutions, and other persons. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in Henry Hardy, ed,
The Proper Study of Mankind: An Anthology of Essays 191, 193 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux
1997). The conventional identification of negative liberty merely with "negative rights," or "the
right to be let alone," impoverishes Berlin's view, which involved a distinctly affirmative view of
the value of "negative" protections.
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of personhood that they charge property regimes with promoting.
Critics concerned with the expropriative potential of expanding property rights will also not be placated. Theft is theft, they will say, and the
issue is whether in some cases "property is theft' 6-not whether it
increases the social pie in the long run or leaves the thief secure
against state interference.
Critics concerned with the structure of production will also contend that the conventional defenses of property are simply not on
point. If the concern is whether people are able to enter into free and
collaborative productive relationships, rather than hierarchical and
partly involuntary ones, pointing to economic efficiency and negative
liberty will seem substantially beside the point. I do not mean to say
that critics of expanding property regimes should, or do, deny altogether the force of the conventional pro-property arguments. Rather,
my point is that the two classes of arguments operate as if they were
incommensurable. The proponents and critics talk past each other.
The central argument of this Article is that proponents of expanding property regimes suffer from their neglect of a powerful tradition in Anglo-American jurisprudence and political thought: a freedom-promoting conception of property. This conception originated in
the liberal, reformist Enlightenment period of the mid-to-late eighteenth century, when it was exemplified in the thought of the Scottish
jurist, moral philosopher, and proto-economist Adam Smith. It was
important in the United States in the early decades of the nineteenth
century, when the influence of the Scottish Enlightenment was strong,
but declined later in that century and in the twentieth century." Today
its theoretical underpinnings are experiencing a revival, most prominently in the thought of Nobel laureate economist Amartya Sen.
However, the freedom-promoting tradition has not yet been revived in the realm of property rights, where it had its origin and its
most important early expositions. Instead, advocates of propertybased reform tend to the narrower lines of argument already described," while thinkers who pursue a freedom-promoting reform pro16 Pierre Proudhon, What is Property?An Inquiry Into the Principle of Right and of Government 14 (Cambridge 1994) (Donald R. Kelley and Bonnie G. Smith, trans).
17 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Overdue Recovery of Adam Smith's Reputation as an Economic Theorist, in Michael Fry, ed, Adam Smith's Legacy: His Place in the Development of Modern Economics 1-2 (Rutledge 1992) (arguing that Smith's theories were largely lost and ridiculed
for much of the twentieth century).
18 See, for example, de Soto, The Mystery of Capitalat 63 (cited
in note 1):
A well-integrated legal property system in essence does two things: First, it tremendously
reduces the costs of knowing the economic qualities of assets by representing them in a way
that our senses can pick up quickly; and second, it facilitates the capacity to agree on how to
use assets to create further production and increase the division of labor.
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gram are apt to miss the connection to property rights, even when
their proposals essentially implicate the definition of property." A narrow conception of property thus denies conceptual resources both to
those who think of themselves as property theorists and to those who
do not, but might if they recognized the centrality of property rights to
the freedom-promoting tradition. The purpose of this Article is to reforge the broken circle.
The freedom-promoting conception of property is distinguished
by several features, in which its ideas of property and of freedom intertwine. I begin with the attitude toward property.
In contrast to the libertarian property thinking of the late nineteenth century and that of certain revivalists today, the freedompromoting standpoint does not conceive of property as a fixed and
immutable category.0 Rather, from Smith to Sen, participants in this
tradition understand property as a dynamic institution, a set of rules
evolving in response to technological and social innovation, which
applies a variety of types of claims to a variety of resources.
Members of this tradition understand property as a social institution in this sense: property regimes set the terms on which people are
able to recruit each other for social cooperation. They make up the
grammar of collaboration for any project that is neither solitary nor
motivated by love or force. Property rights thus deeply and necessarily
structure interpersonal relations.
In addition to these attitudes towards property, the tradition I am
describing is marked by a distinctive conception of freedom. Perhaps
most important is that it conceives of freedom functionally: to inquire
how free people are, it asks what they are able to do, which forms of
human potential they have turned into actual capabilities that they
can in fact exercise. This is in contrast to procedural conceptions of
freedom, which ask whether people's personal rights have been violated without their consent' or whether the decisions affecting them
have been subject to a credible form of hypothetical or indirect consent." It is likewise in contrast to substantive, or "positive," conceptions
of freedom, in which the question is whether people have achieved specific forms of personality, activity, or self-mastery, which are identified
19 See Shiller, The New FinancialOrder at 1 (cited in note 2).
For a discussion of this fixed and immutable conception of property, see Gregory S.
Alexander, Commodity and Propriety: Competing Visions of Property in American Legal
Thought 1776-1970 243-302 (Chicago 1997).
21 See generally Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State,and Utopia (Basic 1974).
22
See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 11 (Belknap 1971) ("Thus we are to imagine that
those who engage in social cooperation choose together, in one joint act, the principles which are
to assign basic rights and duties and to determine the division of social benefits.").
20

1244

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:1237

with being free." The conception of freedom that this Article revives
does not claim to identify the purposes of human life, but insists on
knowing what people in fact are able to do-that is, what choices are
genuinely open to them.
This conception of freedom directs attention to two specific considerations, in addition to actual or hypothetical consent, in assessing
degrees of freedom. One of these is the set of viable options an individual faces: she is regarded as more free to the extent that she confronts more rather than fewer viable alternatives. This consideration
thus directs attention to the structure of social rules that open or close
practical alternatives, particularly the rules of the property regime.
The other consideration points inward, toward the individual psyche. This consideration concerns self-conception: whether a person
thinks of herself as the kind of agent whose interests and commitments are self-authorizing reasons for her to act and give others reason to respect her person and projects; or whether, alternatively, she
either fails to formulate interests and commitments of her own or is
psychologically inhibited from acting on them. In diagnosing property
regimes, therefore, it becomes important to consider whether they
promote relationships of domination and subordination, which tend to
inhibit self-assertion by the subordinated, or whether, alternatively,
they promote reciprocity and cultivate the habit of recognizing and

23 This family of views understands property as a precondition of people's becoming, in a
relevant sense of Berlin's phrase, masters of themselves: realizing some individual or collective
good that makes their lives appropriate, worthy, excellent, or otherwise commendable. Berlin,
Two Concepts of Liberty at 203 (cited in note 15) ("The 'positive' sense of the word 'liberty'
derives from the wish on the part of the individual to be his own master.").
There are several distinct species of this genus of argument. One has to do with the development of personality. It proposes that ownership of property is necessary to the development of
free will and intentionality; to the capacity to form a plan of life and act consistently with it over
time; and to habits of prudence and responsibility. See Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private
Property 301-02 (Oxford 1988) ("It is necessary for the free man not only to be independent of
others, but actively to assert himself as a free and independent will and to be recognized as such
by others."); Alan Ryan, Property 71-76 (Minnesota 1987) (arguing that the system of property
rights must reflect individuals' need for "a space for free movement and secure social attachments").
Another strand of argument contends that private property enables individuals to participate in collective goods, usually the political life of the community. See, for example, Waldron,
The Right to Private Property at 313-18; Ryan, Property at 23-34. Private property enables the
individual to stand as an equal among others in a community of citizens. For a productive discussion of this theme, see Drew R. McCoy, The Elusive Republic:Political Economy in Jeffersonian
America 48-104,68 (North Carolina 1980):

The personal independence that resulted from the ownership of land permitted a citizen to
participate responsibly in the political process, for it allowed him to pursue spontaneously
the common or public good, rather than the narrow interest of the men-or the government-on whom he depended for his support.
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pursuing one's own interests and commitments in the course of negotiating cooperation with others.
In Part I of this Article, I survey the main lines of argument against
expanded property regimes: the anticommodification critique, the
anti-expropriation critique, and the critique of productive organization. In Part II, I present the freedom-promoting tradition, showing its
historical origins in the jurisprudence and proto-economic thought of
Adam Smith. I briefly sketch the tradition's decline in the later nineteenth century, from a dynamic account of the purposes of property to
a static natural-law account of property. I also show the revival of this
tradition in the work of Amartya Sen.
I conclude Part II with a schematic account of the orientation to
freedom. I identify the primary dimensions of the description of any
property regime from this perspective: in short, the description centers
on what a property regime enables people to do, and what rules of
recruitment and collaboration it implies for the things they do collectively. I also identify the pragmatic cornerstones of the orientation in
identifying opportunities for reform: thresholds of technological possibility, constituencies for reform, conceptual opportunities for extension of existing property relations, and opportunities for cultural or
ideological intervention regarding the definition of the interests and
values at stake in any reform.
In Part III, I turn my attention to three specific contemporary reform programs in property regimes. My aim here is not to derive these
programs, or any others, from the theoretical terms of the freedompromoting tradition. Rather, in the manner appropriate to a dynamic
analytics of property, I intend to show how theory and practice are
mutually clarifying. It was reflection on these programs that first led
me to the formulation of the freedom-promoting tradition. In turn,
however, I believe a full appreciation of that tradition helps to identify
aspects of incompleteness in the programs.
At the conclusion of Part III, I return to the three critiques of
property with which I opened the Article, now fleshed out by discussion of the three areas of reform in which they might be seen as having particular bite. I conclude that each one is better addressed by the
freedom-oriented approach to property than by the competing justifications.
In Part IV, I draw special attention to the freedom-promoting approach's ability to clarify the problem of the proper limits of expansions of property rights. I argue that the freedom-promoting approach
partly dissolves this issue by making clear that the question is often
not "for or against property?" but "what kind of property, and in
whom?" The freedom-promoting standpoint provides criteria to answer the question so phrased. It also provides criteria to answer the
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question as traditionally expressed: when property relations should be
excluded from domains presently governed by other rules and values.
I. THE CRITIQUES OF PROPERTY
A. The Anticommodification Critique
The first kind of objection to expanded property regimes is what
I have called the anticommodification critique. The spirit of this objection, if not its full logic, is captured in Remembrances, by John Clare,
the nineteenth-century English peasant and laborer renowned as an
authentically primitive folk-poet."4
Enclosure like a Bonaparte let not a thing remain,
It levelled every bush and tree and levelled every hill
And hung the moles for traitors-though the brook is
running still,
It runs a naked stream, cold and chill.y
Like much traditional North Atlantic debate about expansions in
property regimes, Clare's poem takes as its starting point the archetypal "Enclosure," the conversion of common fields and pastures into
private land-much of it in the hands of nobility and other large landholders- that transformed the English countryside in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries." Unlike many critical accounts of Enclosure,
however, Clare's concentrates not on the distributive consequences of
turning peasants' common land into private holdings of the wealthy
and powerful, but on the way privatization changes people's experience of the land. Enclosure of course did not literally "level[] every
hill" -although it did result in the deaths of many bushes and trees as
sheep farming replaced small-scale cropping, turning fields to pastures.
The image of "leveling" rather refers to a flattening-out of experience
as the local and particular texture of peasants' relationship to their
land is replaced by the abstract, universal terms of monolithic property rights and its accompanying economic logic. 27 Although the landscape remains, some vital quality of liveliness, intimacy, or warmth has
gone out of the human relationship to it. Thus, "though the brook is
running still," it is as "naked ... cold and chill" as the hills are "level."

See James Fenton, Getting Clare Clear, NY Rev of Books 42 (Oct 7,2004).
John Clare, I Am: The Selected Poetry of John Clare 134 (Farrar, Straus, and Giroux
2003) (Jonathan Bate, ed).
26
See J.M. Neeson, Commoners: Common Right, Enclosureand Social Change in England,
1700-1820 259-93 (Cambridge 1993) (explaining the resistance to enclosure by farmers and
freeholders).
See Eric T. Freyfogle, The Tragedy of Fragmentation,36 Valp U L Rev 307,318-22 (2002).
27
24

25
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It no longer provides a hospitable home for human sentiment. The choice
of Napoleon Bonaparte as the simile for Enclosure is telling: Bonaparte
swept across Europe as a conqueror, but also as the violent avatar of
modernity, abolishing traditional social distinctions, elevating middle
classes, and installing a uniform system of law: the Napoleonic Code.
Clare was a nostalgic and romantic poet, and from the point of
view of many historians and historically minded economists, this account of Enclosure is nonsense draped 'round a Maypole.a Peasant
life was crude, often brutish, vulnerable to all manner of violence and
abuse, and seldom tinged by gentle poetic sentiment toward the unyielding land. Enclosure on this account was the necessary instrument
of progress, leading to increased agricultural yields while freeing labor
once used inefficiently on the land to power England's industrial revo-

lution instead. Nor need one have a Panglossian view of Enclosure in
all dimensions to believe that Clare's plaint was, to paraphrase Karl

Marx (a trenchant critic of both Enclosure and pastoral romanticism),
idiocy about rural life.9
Be that as it may, the contention persists that "commodification"
impoverishes the experience of value by subjecting qualitative and

complex relations to market logic; it is hardly restricted to quarrels
over the poetic capacity of the English peasantry. Nowadays the same

argument is sometimes made about relations to the natural world, in
answer to proposals to create property rights in "ecosystem services,"

which, to critics, makes the natural world as much an instrument of
human ends as a household appliance, and thus tends to undercut the
cultural practice of valuing nature "for its own sake. '
The anticommodification argument frequently arises in debates

over markets in human relationships, whether prostitution or the sale
of children, and in parts of human bodies, such as organs.' In these
28 The image is of course intended to suggest a pastoral counterpart to Jeremy Bentham's
characterization of rights as nonsense and natural rights as "nonsense upon stilts." Jeremy Bentham, Anarchical Fallacies,in John Bowing, ed, 2 The Works of Jeremy Bentham 489 (Russell &
Russell 1962).
29 See Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, in The Marx-Engels
Reader 594, 608 (Norton 2d ed 1978) (Robert C. Tucker, ed) (referring to the politically and socially
divided peasants as having all the class consciousness of "a sackful of potatoes").
30 Spaulding, 16 Stan Envir L J at 312 (cited in note 10) ("[T]he 'organic,' holistic qualities
of the resource are lost to commodified consciousness. This loss is particularly troubling and
complex with respect to the conversion of environmental quality into a propertized 'resource.").
31 See Radin, 53 Hastings L J at 1126 (cited in note 10) ("We want the legal system to
make a commitment to an ideal of noncommodification of love, family, and other commitments
close to ourselves."); Fitzgerald, 14 Issues L & Med at 158 (cited in note 10) (describing problems
that can arise when genetic technology introduces notions of control and conditionality into
parenthood, which run counter to the reality of the parenting experience that is filled with the
unforeseeable and uncontrollable); Jefferies, 5 Ind J Global Legal Stud at 622 (cited in note 10)
(exploring the effects of the commodification of organ donation).
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domains, the claim is that in regarding others as fungible sources of
our satisfactions, we accustom ourselves to treating them (in Kantian
terms) as means rather than ends, obscuring the individuality and personhood that should command our respect. 2 The argument also arises
in connection with creative activity (where it dovetails with the objection concerned with the organization of production) in relation to intellectual property. The view that all creative output must be someone's property to create sufficient incentive for further creation seems
to its critics to imply a mean and narrow view of human motives-and,
indeed, promotes the33habit of writing, painting, and singing only when
there is a dollar in it.
The conventional defenses of property have little to say in answer
to this line of attack. They are founded on individual negative liberty
and on economic analysis that takes as its axiom the preferencesatisfaction-maximizing individual, for whom all the world is, strictly
speaking, an opportunity for the fulfillment of his desires.' Their defenses of property in these terms are extremely powerful; but to the
phenomenological critic, they only make matters worse, for they seem
to underscore indifference to other, qualitative considerations. To the
explanation that a rational agent in a private-property regime is enabled to reap the full economic benefits of exploitation of his land,
and thus has maximum incentive to exploit it optimally, the critic is apt
to blurt in exasperation, He would!
The Critique of Expropriation

B.

This critique is captured in another poem treating Enclosure, this
one an anonymous piece of incendiary doggerel:
The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
But leaves the greater villain loose
Who steals the common from off the goose.
The law demands that we atone
See generally Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for
Bioethics (Encounter 2002) (arguing in non-Kantian terms that commodifying others demeans
their personhood). For a contemporary account of the Kantian ethical view, see Christine M.
Korsgaard, Creatingthe Kingdom of Ends 109 (Cambridge 1996).
33
A different view comes from the singer-songwriter Gillian Welch, who comments on
Napster, "They figured it outfThat we're gonna do it anyway/Even if it doesn't pay." Gillian
Welch, Everything is Free on Time (The Revelator) (Acony Records 2001), lyrics available online
at http://www.cowboylyricscom/lyrics/welch-giUian/everything-is-free-1293.hml (visited Sept 18,2005).
Of course I do not mean to say that neoclassical economists are committed to an empiri34
cal characterization of human nature as egoistic. The description of people as self-interested
satisfaction maximizers is a methodological axiom, whose strength is intended to lie in its power to
generate precise and complex predictions of behavior on the basis of parsimonious assumptions.
32
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When we take things we do not own
But leaves the lords and ladies fine
Who take things that are yours or mine.
The poor and wretched don't escape
If they conspire the law to break;
This must be so but they endure
Those who conspire to make the law.
The law locks up the man or woman
Who steals the goose from off the common
And geese will still a common lack
Till they go and steal it back.35
This is conceptually the most straightforward of the critiques.
Methodologically, it involves none of the heterodox elements of the
anticommodification critique. It can be rendered either in Marxist
terms," or as a rather pessimistic application of public choice theory."
The spirit of this critique is its insistence on the cynic's question: Cui
bono? Who benefits?
The critique begins with the definitional observation that programs to expand the domain or intensity of property rights must vest
the novel rights in somebody. This point is then joined to a proposal
that such reforms in legal regimes tend to come about when they have
a constituency-most frequently one that stands to benefit from the
change. From these two claims alone, one would expect the expansion
of property in many cases to vest new claims in politically powerful
constituencies.8
In specific cases, the claim is typically that resources previously
held either in informal, often semicommunal arrangements, or else as
open-access commons (such as air, water, cultural productions, or information) are "enclosed" to the benefit of some group. In reforms of
land tenure, the beneficiary group is often a relatively sophisticated
class in a country with a precolonial or colonial land regime of semicommunal property: this narrative of opportunistic reform most
closely resembles the skeptical picture of Enclosure. 9 As to culture,
35

See Boyle, 66 Law & Contemp Probs at 33 (cited in note 3).

36 See Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation:The Politicaland Economic Origins of Our

Time 130-34 (Farrar & Rinehart 1944).
37 See generally Saul Levmore, Property's Uneasy Path and Expanding Future,70 U Chi L
Rev 181 (2003); Banner, 31 J Legal Stud 359 (cited in note 13).
38
See Levmore, 70 U Chi L Rev at 190-94 (cited in note 37).
39
See Ngugi, 25 Mich J Intl L at 500 (cited in note 11) (describing the opportunistic behavior of the Kenyan government in devising a plan that created a "landed African gentry");
Marden, 22 BC Intl & Comp L Rev at 280 (cited in note 11) ("The uncompensated 'harvesting'
of biological resources from developing states can be seen as an insidious new form of colonial-
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information, or open-access natural resources previously thought to
be inherently public, the beneficiary is generally an industry already
sophisticated in the business of exploiting the resource.
C.

The Critique of Productive Organization
It's not a water-mill really, labor. It's like the nocturnal

paper-mill pulverizing, crushing each fiber of rag into atoms,
or the workhouse tread-mill, smooth-lipped, that wore down a
London of doxies and sharps,
or the flour mill, faeique, that raised the cathedrals and wore our

hosts of dust-demons,
but it's mostly the miller's curse-gift, forgotten of God yet still
grinding, the saltmill, that makes the sea, salt. 1
The point of origin for this critique, as for the poetry of Anne
Winters, is Marxist thought, which posited a logic inherent in each
stage of technological and social history: to any level of technology

there corresponded a way of organizing production.4'2 To that organization, in turn, there corresponded rights in the means of production:

slavery and mastery for the irrigation-based empires of East Asia,

small-scale ownership for guild-based craft production in Medieval
Europe, and in nineteenth-century industrial Britain, the ownership by
capitalists of factories, raw materials, and machines, and the ownership

by workers of nothing but their hands, their backs, and their waking
hours, which they sold to avert starvation. ' A property system was

therefore a concomitant-an epiphenomenon, in Marxist languageof the productive, and ultimately of the technological, mode of the era.
ism, since multinational companies reap huge benefits while none of the profits flow back to the
states providing the resources."); James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to
Improve the Human Condition Have Failed 47-52 (Yale 1998) (noting how representatives of
colonial powers benefited from surveying and land-partitioning in colonized areas, while natives
did not). See also Bridges, Note, 102 Colum L Rev at 124 (cited in note 11) (describing the commodification of fetal tissue and how it ultimately will come at the expense of the poor black
female).
40
See Boyle, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 36 (cited in note 3) ("In stories about stem cell and
gene sequence patents, critics have mused darkly about the way in which the state is handing
over monopoly power to a few individuals and corporations, potentially introducing bottlenecks
and coordination costs that slow down innovation.").
41 Anne Winters, The Mill-Race, in Anne Winters, The Displaced of Capital 3, 5 (Chicago
2004).
42
See Karl Marx, Manifesto of the Communist Party, in The Marx-Engels Reader 469,47778 (cited in note 29) (describing the ever-changing means of production and exchange, particularly that which led by the bourgeois class from feudalism to capitalism).
43
Id at 482 ("All the preceding classes that got the upper hand, sought to fortify their
already acquired status by subjecting society at large to their conditions of appropriation.").
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From this perspective, the expansion of property rights into new
domains brings the activity of those domains under the direction of
the productive imperatives of "the market." Making traditional farmers into freeholders in an agricultural economy transforms them into
small-scale capitalists. Whatever else they have been, they will now be
dancers to the market's tune, producing what consumers (and distributors) demand, enjoying flush years when they gamble correctly at
planting time on the slopes of supply and demand at the harvest,
tightening their belts when their guesses are wrong.
The equation at the heart of this critique, then, is between property rights and hierarchically organized production. Ultimately, the
hierarchy is that of the market itself: those who do what sells thrive,
and those who follow their whims-unless they are lucky enough to
have whims that coincide with market demand-go broke and eventually go hungry. By adopting this regime, as Yochai Benkler has
pointed out, today's societies have won massive productivity at the
cost of most people's autonomy in choosing the form of productive
activity in which they spend their time and energy. The choice is a
creditable one, for the wealth born of productivity increases people's
freedom in innumerable ways; but it is also a tragic one, a purchase of
freedom in the coin of freedom forgone.

II. THE FREEDOM-PROMOTING APPROACH TO PROPERTY
A.

Adam Smith and His Successors: The Origins and Eclipse
of the Freedom-Promoting Tradition

From the long history of thought about property and freedom, I
mean to draw a single tradition, which runs from the eighteenth century through today. Its first avatar was Adam Smith, the prophet, advocate, and theorist of one of history's great expansions of property:
the rise of the principle that each person's labor is an intrinsic quantum of personal property, which she may freely alienate by agreement,
provided such agreements are bounded by the right of exit. Smith's
account of an economy governed by these simple principles of "natural liberty," which channel the axiomatic self-interest of each individual into socially beneficial courses, is famously the foundation of neoclassical economics. Smith is, in consequence, sometimes anachronistically mistaken for a simple free-market libertarian committed to a
historically invariant scheme of natural individual rights.5 To accept
44 See Benkler, 52 Duke L J at 1247 (cited in note 12) (describing how the pursuit of productivity and growth limits democracy, autonomy, and equality).
45
As Alan Ryan puts it in a passage that exemplifies the received view of Smith:
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only this received view of Smith is to overlook the revolutionary advance in freedom that he believed the rise of free labor would bring.6
It is in this aspect of his thought, which complements his contribution
to the foundations of neoclassical economics, that Smith is the founder
of the freedom-promoting tradition in political economy and property
thought.
Smith's account of the system of commercial relationships- those
founded on private property, mediated by contract, and bounded by
exit, without obligations derived from status or inheritance-involved
close attention to the dynamics of freedom and domination. For

Smith, the significance of market relations for freedom lay precisely in
the social consequences of the bargains they facilitated: by diminish-

ing the prerogative attached to tradition and status, and requiring persons to bargain over the terms of their cooperative enterprises, commerce brought the mighty low and elevated the poor, closing the cruel
gap in sympathy and self-understanding that feudal and courtly hier-

archy produced. 7'
To appreciate this less widely recognized dimension of Smith's

commitments, it is necessary first to grasp two aspects of his thought.
First, he regarded economies and societies not just quantitatively in
terms of their efficiency or productivity, but also qualitatively. Any

social and economic regime depends on the existence of, and produces, people of a certain kind. Any social and economic regime is
thus also a regime of character. The rise of free labor, with its new
market negotiations around labor, was also necessarily the rise of a
newly dominant form of character, which would both express and undergird the workings of market society.4'
This view connects liberty and property by arguing that so long as individuals use only what
is theirs, they cannot limit the liberty of others. Liberty is maximized, indeed, "natural liberty" [Smith's famous phrase] is unscathed, if everyone employs only what is theirs to employ and refrains from employing what is not theirs. The only way liberty is invaded is by
incursions on what is not ours. We have here the classical defense of the "simple system of
natural liberty" beloved by Adam Smith.
Ryan, Property at 82-83 (cited in note 23). While this does indeed describe a dimension of
Smith's thought, it might be more accurate to say that it is a one-sided received view of Smith.
46
Valuable recent scholarship on Smith's thought and milieu is well captured in Emma
Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet, and the Enlightenment (Harvard
2001) (arguing that sentiments, uncertainty, and concern for equality were as much of an issue
for Smith as order and reason). Much of the important early work on the rediscovery of Smith's
complexity is gathered in Istvan Hont and Michael Ignatieff, eds, Wealth and Virtue: The Shaping
of PoliticalEconomy in the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge 1983). See also generally Alexander Broadie, ed, The Cambridge Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge 2003).
47 See Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 61-66 (Oxford 1976) (D.B. Raphael
and A.L. Macfie, eds) (describing how the rich and powerful are the subject of admiration while
the poor are neglected, causing the "corruption of our moral sentiments").
48 Id.
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Second, Smith believed that the foundational motive underlying
all social relations, including economies, was not a desire for wealth as
such, but rather a desire for the esteem of one's contemporaries. He
put the matter bluntly, demoting wealth-seeking to a derivative position: "It is chiefly from the regard to the sentiments of others that we
pursue riches and avoid poverty." 9 Admiration and emulation pervade

social relations, as do their near-opposites -indifference

and aversion

to the poor and powerless." To understand the qualitative, or charac-

terological, dimensions of an economy, therefore, one must understand the way esteem works in that economy.
Smith's argumentative strategy was to contrast a social order
founded on free labor with two other contemporary orders to show

how commodification of personal labor made people at once more
free and more fit to be free. Smith's first contrast was between market
relations, founded on commodified labor, and a courtly society, in
which both sustenance and social relations depended on status: substantially inherited positions, each of which carried with it inherent duties,
privileges, and rank.' In a courtly society, hereditary nobles and high

gentry dominated the distribution of esteem. In consequence, those
who admired and emulated them became courtiers-sycophants de-

pendent on the whim and favor of their superiors, or in Smith's language, "the fanciful and foolish favour of ignorant, presumptuous, and

proud superiors." 2 In such settings, "flattery and falsehood too often
prevail over merit and abilities." 3 The search for esteem in a courtly
49
Id at 70. The desire for esteem is a consequence of sympathy, or the desire that one's
sentiments should be in harmony with those of others, a more complex motivation that Smith
treats at length in The Theory of Moral Sentiments. He writes:

Nature, when she formed man for society, endowed him with an original desire to please,
and an original aversion to offend his brethren. She taught him to feel pleasure in their favourable, and pain in their unfavourable regard. She rendered their approbation most flattering and most agreeable to him for its own sake; and their disapprobation most mortifying and most offensive.
Id at 116.
50
Smith writes, "The man of rank and distinction is observed by all the world. Everybody
is eager to look at him, and to conceive, at least by sympathy, that joy and exultation with which
his circumstances naturally inspire him." Id at 51. The source of this charisma is, somewhat tautologically (or axiomatically, as Smith would have it), distinction itself the implicit social designation of the high-ranking individual as fit to be seen, "[t]o be observed, to be attended to, to be
taken notice of with sympathy, complacency, and approbation." Id. Of the poor, Smith writes by
contrast: "The poor man goes out and comes in unheeded, and when in the midst of a crowd, is in
the same obscurity as if shut up in his own hovel." Id.
51 See Henry Sumner Maine, The Ancient Law 164-65 (Beacon 1963) (Frederick Pollack,
ed) ("All the forms of Status taken notice of in the Law of Persons were derived from, and to
some extent are still coloured by, the powers and privileges anciently residing in the Family.").
52
Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments at 87 (cited in note 47).
53
Id.
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society is thus a path to degradation: it creates a form of domination
in which the subordinate, subject to the arbitrary whim of the superior,
adopts tastes, manners, and attitudes to suit his perception of the superior's desires. Smith writes that courtiers "are proud to imitate and
resemble [their superiors] in the very qualities which dishonour and
degrade them.... They desire to be praised for what they themselves
''
do not think praiseworthy, and are ashamed of unfashionable virtues." 4
Such courtiers cannot even formulate and pursue their own interests and commitments independent of the relations of material and
psychic dependence that they inhabit.5 This is the classic psychological
harm done by dominant-subordinate relationships to the subordinate
parties' capacity to exercise freedom.
Smith contrasted free labor regimes with slave societies as well as
with status-based economies. This selection of contrasts is striking for
what it reveals about Smith's conception of the threats to freedom
that confronted his period. The contrast between a society of free labor and a courtly society is one between early modernity and premodernity. However, Smith seems to have regarded the image of a
slave society not as a vestige of premodernity, but as a premonition of
modernity gone wrong. In his view, slavery, like free labor, could not
be understood exclusively along the lines of economic efficiency. Although he regarded slavery as less efficient than free labor because
slaves lack the incentive created by a right to the fruits of one's work,6
Smith believed that slavery must be interpreted as a social relationship, and so as a system of status and emulation. Slavery appeals to
"the love of domination and authority and the pleasure men take in
having every thing done by their express orders."5 This is the ultimate
satisfaction of domination. It is possible only when coupled with the
total subjection of a class of persons.
In what sense is slavery emblematic of a possible modernity
which Smith wishes to avert? It is central to his characterization of
slavery that, despite its inferior economic performance, it is not likely
to disappear of its own accord. Rather, the persistence, even the exac54

Id at 88.

55 See Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom 74-76 (Knopf 1999) (describing the impor-

tance of a person's capability as a form of "freedom to achieve alternative functioning combinations" that can be limited by many life circumstances such as famine or social status).
56 See John Fabian Witt, Speedy Fred Taylor and the Ironies of Enterprise Liability, 103
Colum L Rev 1, 5-6 (2003) ("From Adam Smith to Benjamin Franklin to William Lloyd Garrison, leading thinkers in Anglo American tradition viewed the incentives provided by free labor
as vastly more efficient than the compulsions and coercions of unfree labor alternatives."). Note
that this "was slavery efficient?" argument is all some people get from Smith.
57
Adam Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence 186 (Liberty Classics 1982) (R.L. Meek, D.D.
Raphael, and PG. Stein, eds).
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erbation, of slavery seemed to Smith to be perfectly compatible with
the growth of the defining political and economic characteristics of
modernity: republican government and prosperity. Republican governments made up of slaveholders, he argued, were much less likely
than monarchies to abolish slavery, because the social standing of the
slaveholding class depended on its continued enjoyment of "domination and authority" over its human property." By contrast, the monarch's status was independent of any claim on slaves, as he stood categorically apart from even his free countrymen. Indeed, the monarch
might even wish to weaken wealthy and independent citizens by liberating their slaves. The slave's prospects for freedom would thus grow
worse as republican liberty advanced in a slaveholding society: "[L]ove
of domination and tyrannizing, I say, will make it impossible for the
slaves in a free country ever to recover their liberty."59
On Smith's account, so long as slavery persisted, prosperity would
worsen the condition of slaves. The simple reason was that a rich society would have more slaves than a poor society, and thus, to avert the
prospect of slave revolts, become a police state, with slaves on the receiving end of the proverbial boot-heel. The more complex reason was
that the wealth of the master increased the social, and hence the psychological, distance between him and his slaves. Smith imputed to the
relatively poor slaveholder, who worked alongside his chattel, a sympathetic attitude to these bonded creatures who so resembled him.?o
The wealthy master, however, would lead a life so removed from the
experience of the slaves that "he will hardly look on him as being of
the same kind; he thinks he has little title even to the
'6 1 ordinary enjoyments of life, and feels but little for his misfortunes.
This analysis led Smith to one of the most arresting passages in
his work:
Opulence and freedom, the two greatest blessings men can possess, tend greatly to the misery of this body of men [slaves], which
in most countries where slavery is allowed makes by far the
greatest part. A humane man would wish therefore if slavery has
58

Idat181:

The persons who make the laws in that country are persons who have slaves themselves.
These will never make any laws mitigating their usage; whatever laws are made with regard
to slaves are intended to strengthen the authority of the masters and reduce the slaves to a
more absolute subjection.
59

Idat 186.
Id at 184 (arguing that slaves and masters in poor countries "eat at the same table, work
together, and [are] clothed in the same manner" so that there is "no great difference betwixt the
master and slave").
61 Id at 184.
60
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to be generally established that these greatest blessings, being incompatible with the happiness of the greatest part of mankind,
were never to take place. 62
The most important word in the passages just quoted is if. "if slavery
has to be generally established." The burden of Smith's argument is
that the redefinition of property in human labor, from a world in
which some people are property to one in which all have it to alienate
freely, is foundational. From that choice flows, in some measure or another, nearly everything else.
A key to the stakes of the choice lies, again, in Smith's characterization of the psychology of slaveholding. Masters love to dominate
absolutely, he writes, "rather than to condescend to bargain and treat
with those whom they look on as their inferiors. '3 "Bargain and treat"
is a striking choice of phrase, echoing as it does Smith's famous observation of "a certain propensity in human nature ... to truck, barter,

and exchange." To "bargain and treat" is to "truck [and] barter," that
is, to enter into dealings with others that they might exit, to make offers
that they might refuse. It is a relationship that may contain all sorts of
inequality; however, it does not contain prerogative, that essential vehicle of whim and domination.
This difference is the key to the social and economic order that
Smith famously endorses: a society of free bargaining and free labor.
In the absence of prerogative, and with the consequent right of exit,
two people who come together to bargain stand foursquare with each
other. The claim each can make on the other is limited by the resources (including the strength and talent) of the one, and by the interest and need (which may of course be abject) of the other. However imperfect this reciprocity, it is reciprocity, in contrast to the basic
interactions of the other social orders Smith describes. It requires that
each address the other as she understands herself, or persuade her to
understand herself differently.65 It makes much more vulnerable the
noble's or master's assumption that the social world answers autoId at 185.
Id at 186.
64 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 25 (Oxford
1976) (R.H. Campbell, A.S. Skinner, and W.B. Todd, eds) (emphasis added) (noting that this
propensity in human nature is the explanation for the principle of division of labor).
65
As Smith told his students:
62
63

[Tlhe principle in the human mind on which this disposition of trucking is founded ... is
clearly the naturall [sic] inclination every one has to persuade. The offering of a shilling...
is in reality offering an argument to persuade one to do so and so as it is for his interest ....
And in this manner every one is practicing oratory on others thro [sic] the whole of his life.
Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudenceat 352 (cited in note 57).
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matically to his whim. It therefore short circuits the most stark forms
of domination, and creates at least the preconditions for what one
might call the free development of personality.
I have placed such stress on Smith's discussion of contrasting social orders and their consequences for freedom not to discount the
received and straightforward dimensions of his thought, but to augment it. The redefinition of individual talents and labor as personal
property famously contributed to the efficient allocation of productive
resources, and so increased the aggregate of social wealth with which
individuals could develop and exercise their capabilities. It also, in the
most straightforward way, liberated those who had been the property
of others; the liberation was not comprehensive, of course, but it was
categorical. Fmally, the rise of free labor set in motion a new social dynamic, in which the psychic satisfactions of domination became harder
to pursue, more utilitarian satisfactions came to substitute for them, and
a measure of reciprocity (relative to absolute domination) became part
of the grammar of social life.
It is my impression that Smith's dynamic view of property and
political economy, in which the goals of freedom and efficiency come
first, and particular legal instruments are evaluated contextually in
light of their ability to promote those goals, gradually ossified into a
form of institutional essentialism, in which the legal tools were misidentified as immutable, necessary, even natural, rights.6 James May
has demonstrated that in the antitrust jurisprudence of the late nineteenth century, judges displayed the profound influence of an account
of free-market economies as reflecting "natural" relations of liberty
and economic value, which in turn provided a baseline for identifying
and correcting deviations into "unnatural" relations.6 Gregory Alexander has shown how late nineteenth-century constitutional jurisprudence reflected the same valorization of economic principles derived
originally from the aims of the free-labor movement as in themselves
the primary instruments of securing freedom, rather than potentially
dynamic tools of a freestanding (and, of course, potentially evolving)
66 For an equally speculative account in line with this proposal, see Duncan Kennedy, The
Role of Law in Economic Thought.Essays on the Fetishism of Commodities,34 Am U L Rev 939,
940-67 (1985) (noting that nineteenth-century American economists "emphasize that ... 'natural,
free, and just' outcomes make everyone better off than they could be under an 'unnatural' (or
artificial or distorted) system that might be created by interfering with freedom of production
and exchange").
67 See James May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918, 135 U Pa L Rev 495, 561-84
(1987) (noting that prior to World War I, American economic writers "displayed a common
belief that economic life ultimately could and had to be understood as arising from the operation
of basic, naturaleconomic laws") (emphasis added).
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conception of freedom. " By the time the second generation of Progressives and the first generation of welfare economists began challenging this body of thought, the target had become so ossified and so
identified with its "natural" principles that positing general wellbeing
rather than axiomatic rules as the goal of economic and legal policy
seemed a radical innovation, rather than a return to origins. It was
really only with Sen's careful rereading of Smith as the precursor to
his own form of heterodox, freedom-oriented welfare economics that
the continuity became clear, and the later decades of the nineteenth

century emerged as a detour into institutional essentialism, and not at all
the exemplar of traditional economic thought their critics had imagined
them to be.

B.

The Conception of Freedom: Amartya Sen
The account of freedom in this Article derives in part from the
historical tradition of liberal, reformist political economy discussed in
Part II.A, particularly the thought of Adam Smith. It has its most
powerful contemporary expositor in the Nobel laureate economist
and philosopher Amartya Sen. Sen's account is notable for its freedom
from the usual tics of the genre, such as painstaking examination of
the boundary between negative "freedom from" interference and

positive "freedom to" do or be one thing or another.6 Sen proposes
that both negative protections and positive entitlements should be
understood in terms of what they enable persons to do, that is, the "ca-

pabilities" or "functionings" they make possible in a person's life.0 The
right against being arbitrarily imprisoned, the right to a subsistence,
and the right to participate in one's political community enable people
68 See Alexander, Commodity and Propriety at 248-76 (cited in note 20) (noting that, by
the end of the nineteenth century, "the Supreme Court's constitutional property jurisprudence
had ... substantially shifted toward the private commodified understanding").
69 1 agree with Sen's remark:

The question of foundation is a very difficult one to resolve, and it is not very clear what
would count as providing an adequate foundation of a substantive moral theory. There is, in
fact, some evidence of arbitrary distinction when it comes to evaluation of particular moral
theories. Some who find no difficulty at all in intrinsically evaluating "utility," or "interest"
of individuals, or some idea of "equal treatment," find it intolerably arbitrary to begin with
an assertion of rights. But any moral theory would have to begin with some primitive diagnosis of value (even if it is a procedural one in terms of some mythical primordial state),
and the real question is whether the acknowledgement of rights cannot play that primitive
role. The question is not meant as a rhetorical one. I accept fully that one has to dig for
foundations, but there is a substantial issue involved in deciding where to stop digging.
Amartya Sen, Rights and Capabilities,in Amartya Sen, Resources, Values, and Development 307,
310 (Harvard 1984) (internal citation omitted).
70
See id at 316-17 ("[T]he category of capabilities does come close to being able to reflect
freedom in the positive sense.").
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to do certain things: make and pursue life plans, form intimate and
civic attachments, cultivate their talents, and so forth. They are parts of
a form of life, an arrangement of institutions, rules, and practices that
together produce or facilitate the capabilities of their members. To be
more rather than less free is to enjoy greater capabilities relative to
one's potential.1
Sen introduces a two-part distinction within his conception of
freedom, which captures some of the appeal of the "freedom from"
and "freedom to" distinction without succumbing to the same intractability. He terms the two, complementary aspects of freedom the
process and opportunity dimensions.2 The process aspect guarantees
(1) noninterference by others in the making of one's decisions, and
(2) noninterference by others in the reasonable pursuit of the projects
one has chosen. 3 For instance, the ground rules of a market society, in
which joint activity is coordinated by voluntary contracts, which are
negotiated on the basis of private claims to property and bounded by
each party's freedom of exit, provide formal protection of each person's right to do only as she chooses, without unreasonable interference. As Sen points out, the process aspect of freedom is not simply a
formal precondition for certain kinds of functioning; rather, it is essentially linked to one of the most important capabilities, the deliberation
and self-scrutiny that make our choices choices, rather than mere
fruits of impulse. As he puts it:
A person is not only an entity that can enjoy one's own consumption, experience and appreciate one's welfare, and have one's goals,
but also an entity that can examine one's values and objectives
and choose in the light of those values and objectives .... We can
ask what we want to do and how, and in that context also examine what we should want and how.4

Sen has developed this position in many essays. In addition to those just cited, see Sen,
Markets and Freedoms at 501 (cited in note 13) (analyzing the mechanism of competitive markets
from the perspective of individual freedom); Amartya Sen, Opportunitiesand Freedoms,in Sen,
Rationality and Freedom 583 (cited in note 13) (applying the discipline of social choice to the
idea of freedom); Amartya Sen, Freedom and the Evaluation of Opportunity, in Sen, Rationality
and Freedom 659, 659, 664-66, 694 (cited in note 13) (discussing the "opportunity aspect" of
freedom, "choice-act valuation," and "option appreciation"); Amartya Sen, Goods and People, in
Sen, Resources, Values, and Development 509 (cited in note 69) (examining the world hunger
problem). See generally Sen, Development as Freedom (cited in note 55).
72
See Sen, Markets and Freedoms at 506 (cited in note 13) ("[Flreedom gives us the opportunity to achieve our objectives ....[Importance is also attached to the process of autonomous choice.") (emphasis added).
73
See id at 507-08.
74
Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom, in Sen, Rationality and Freedom 1, 36 (cited in
note 13).
71
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The point is not that a highly deliberative or cognitive view of
practical reasoning is clearly the "right description" of human activity,
but that the capacity to reason in this way, and the ineluctable tendency to understand our decisions in terms of better and worse alternatives rather than brute instincts, constitute one of our most significant capabilities, which the process aspect of freedom secures and
promotes in a direct manner. 71
The second dimension of freedom is the opportunity aspect.
Freedom from interference means little to a person faced with "a
choice over three alternative achievements that are seen as 'bad,' 'terrible,' and 'disastrous,"' even though from the perspective solely of
process freedom, this person will enjoy "exactly as much freedom as
[if she had] a choice over ... three alternative achievements which are
seen as 'good,' 'terrific,' and 'wonderful.' ''76 The opportunity aspect of
freedom states formally the emphasis on those considerations intuitively linked to functions and capabilities: acting physically, operating
socially, and pursuing those projects that one in fact values. Any person's opportunity freedom encompasses both the number and variety
of activities and projects actually available to her and the value
of the
7
alternatives to her in light of her interests and commitments.1
Sen's distinctions cast light on an important conceptual point.
Analytically, there are three ways that freedom, understood as capabilities, can be limited. Although they are interconnected in practice,
they are conceptually distinct. The first is interpersonal domination:
one person's power to override arbitrarily the wishes and actions, and
even to dominate the personality, of another. 8 The second is a structural constraint: the legal, economic, or political order may limit the set
of choices available to a person, even though she is unconstrained in
her selection among those choices.7 This restriction of freedom has as
its extreme form a Hobson's choice, that is, a choice that is no choice
at all because it is made-without interpersonal interference -from a
set of choices encompassing only one viable option. The extreme but
75 On these themes, see generally Christine Korsgaard, Reflective Endorsement, in Christine M. Korsgaard, ed, The Sources of Normativity 49 (Cambridge 1996) (discussing how humans
constantly review their moral choices to see if they "survive reflection"); Charles Taylor, Sources
of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity (Harvard 1989).
76
Sen, Markets and Freedomsat 515 (cited in note 13).
77 See id at 512-23.
78 This was of particular concern to Adam Smith, see Smith, Lectures on Jurisprudence at
8-9 (cited in note 57) (discussing the importance of reputation as a property right), as will
emerge in Parts III.A and IV.B.
79 A very productive account of the analytics of this class of constraint appears in David
Singh Grewal, Network Power and Globalization,17(2) Ethics & Intl Aff 89,92-93 (2003) ("The
network power of a dominant standard converts the freedom to choose freely into the freedom
to choose by eliminating the viability of alternative[s].").
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exemplary case is that of a landless worker-in a remote region or a
company town-who lacks the resources to leave and must choose
between employment on whatever terms the sole local employer offers, on the one hand, or starvation on the other. The choice to accept
employment will be voluntary in the sense that it is undertaken without overt interference by another. It will not, however, be a free choice
in the sense of one made from a set of more than one viable option.
This second limitation corresponds to an important dimension of
context-sensitivity in Sen's account. The level of resources necessary
to achieve a given capability may vary enormously from society to
society. Thus the "same" structural conditions may result in very different choice-sets.o For instance, appearing in public without shame
may in one setting require only a single bolt of cloth, appropriately
wrapped and tucked; in another setting (say, a contemporary workplace or school), it requires a wardrobe sufficient for daily variation of
one's ensemble over at least a week. Participation in the buying and
selling of goods in one setting requires sandals to walk to the marketplace; in an exurban American setting, it requires a car. The list is indefinitely extendable. Thus, to understand the set of viable choices from
which a person may in fact choose, it is necessary to know not just the
bundle of resources that the person commands, but also what capabilities those resources enable her to exercise in the setting where she
finds herself.
The third limitation on freedom is internal: it consists of forms of
delusion, inhibition, neurosis, or other impediments to perceiving, ac8
knowledging, or acting on one's preferences or commitments. ' Selfregard and aspiration, an idea of oneself as an agent with purposes,
plans, and interests, is necessary before people can recognize the gap
between their present level of freedom and their possible level.
Domination inhibits the development of such a self-conception, and
so produces internal barriers to freedom that complement external
barriers. This constraint on freedom is distinct from the objective fact
80 See Amartya Sen, Poor,Relatively Speaking, in Sen, Resources, Values, and Development
325,336 (cited in note 69) (explaining, for example, that the level of resources necessary to avoid
shame and to participate in the activities of a community differs among societies).
81 The idea in its contemporary form owes something to Sigmund Freud's account of the
relationship between consciousness and the unconscious. See, for example, Sigmund Freud, New
Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis 35-77 (Penguin 2d ed 1991) (James Strachey and
Angela Richards, eds) (James Strachey, trans). It also reflects Karl Marx's contention that, under
capitalism (as under all previous economic systems) people systematically misapprehend both
their genuine interests and their genuine nature. In typically Germanic fashion, "[Allienated
labor makes the species-life of a man a means to his physical existence. The consciousness which
man has from his species is altered through alienation, so that species-life becomes a means for
him." Karl Marx, Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society 295 (Hackett 1997)
(Loyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, eds and trans).
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of domination or structural constraint: the view of oneself as a person
incapable of formulating and acting on interests and commitments
needs no objective corollary to inhibit free action.
As Sen puts it:
The most blatant forms of inequalities and exploitations survive
in the world through making allies out of the deprived and the
exploited. The underdog learns to bear the burden so well that he
or she overlooks the burden itself. Discontent is replaced by acceptance, hopeless rebellion by conformist quiet, and ... suffering
and anger by cheerful endurance.8
The freedom-promoting approach seeks to reverse the process
Sen describes here. It aims to unsettle the expectation and experience
of domination and deprivation so that people can gain insight into the
present bounds, and the ultimate potential, of their freedom.
Addressing this last limitation is likely to be the most controversial aim of the program, as it involves distinguishing between people's
expressed preferences and their "true" preferences, a move that is epistemically dubious in principle and associated with totalitarian apologetics in practice.n I take it, however, that Sen's account of how the dominated may fail to recognize such straightforward aspects of selfinterest as their own health provides a relatively uncontroversial version of this idea, which one can build on with due caution."
Sen, Rights and Capabilitiesat 308-09 (cited in note 69).
See Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty at 216-26 (cited in note 15) (quoting, for example,
Fichte's chilling pronouncement that "[nlo one has ... rights against reason"). See also generally
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract (St. Martin's 1978) (Roger D. Masters, ed) (Judith
R. Masters, trans).
84 One helpful effort in this direction is in Martha Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An
Aristotelian Approach, in Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, eds, The Quality of Life 242
(Clarendon 1993). Nussbaum contends that the cumulative acquisition and exercise of capabilities will lead to a progressive appreciation of those capabilities and of the rights and opportunities that secure and promote them, tending to produce a mild convergence among traditions on
the question of how to identify persons' "true interests." Id at 247.
As Jeremy Waldron has noted, positive conceptions of freedom as justifications for property
rights (or much of anything else) fell out of fashion in much of the middle and later twentieth
century for two reasons. See Waldron, The Right to Private Property at 318-22 (cited in note 23).
The first was their association, not least through Berlin's famous essay, with totalitarian regimes.
Id at 318-19. When those in power claim to have an idea of the true interests of their subjects,
which is not falsifiable by the subjects' demurral, they authorize themselves to follow Rousseau's
notorious dictum that those who will not embrace their freedom must "be forced to be free."
Rousseau, On the Social Contract at 55 (cited in note 83) ("Therefore, in order for the social
compact not to be an ineffectual formula, it tacitly includes the following engagement ... that
whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be forced to be free."). Any designation of a positive conception of liberty, toward which people ought to strive or be guided, fell under this
shadow.
The second was the overwhelming power of utilitarian and then economic accounts of the
benefits of private property. The now-familiar account of property's power to allocate resources
82

83
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These three constraints on freedom, and the corresponding approaches to promoting each dimension of freedom, do not map neatly
onto "negative" and "positive" conceptions of freedom. That famous
distinction, indelibly associated with Isaiah Berlin, envisages "negative
liberty" as "the degree to which no man or body of men interferes
with my activity,"' in contrast to the more varied "positive freedom,"
which "consists in being one's own master." Promoting a capabilitiesoriented conception of freedom involves both securing persons
against interference and helping them toward the resources, institutional context, and psychologically significant experiences that undergird "positive" self-direction. Unlike many conceptions of positive
liberty, however, the capabilities conception of freedom is not committed to any specific vision of the content of positive liberty, that is, an
account of how one must live in order to be free. Nor does each aspect
of freedom imply a distinct class of remedies, such as "positive" rights
to opportunity-enhancing goods or purely "negative" rights against
interpersonal interference. Rather, the two aspects of freedom-process
and opportunity-and the three domains in which it may be inhibited
or promoted-interpersonal domination, structural constraints, and
internal constraints-are properly regarded as interwoven parameters
that can help one to identify barriers to the realization of potential
capacity, and thereby to help identify opportunities for reform that
can press back or erase those barriers.
C.

Descriptive and Pragmatic Dimensions of the
Freedom-Promoting Approach

This Article so far has had more to say about the conception of
freedom it promotes than with how that promotion should proceed. In
this Part, I move to address this second aspect of the question: what
does a freedom-promoting approach to property law do? As Michael
Heller has written in a related discussion:
Property theory scholarship aimed at reform works cyclicallyreasoning from real-world contests over scarce resources, to analytic tools that translate these struggles into useful conceptual
terms, to jurisprudential debates regarding the rightness of resultefficiently and correct incentives by internalizing externalities seemed to do so much, it was
unclear what contribution remained to be made by so diffuse and contested a concept as freedom; but if freedom deserved a place, it should be the analytically tractable conception of negative freedom, which is consistent with economists' chaste attitude to interpersonal utility comparisons and the evaluation of human ends-an attitude somewhat at odds with the more influential theories of positive freedom.
85 Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty at 194 (cited in note 15).
86 Id at 203.
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ing allocations, to practical politics that implement one property
regime or another, and then back to the on-the-ground struggles
which refuse to hold still."'
Similarly, a freedom-promoting approach to property moves from
practice to theory and back again, and among the domains within
practice and theory: courts, politics, and technology on the one hand;
economic, jurisprudential, and philosophical thought on the other.
The freedom-oriented approach tries both to identify and to seize
real-world opportunities to promote freedom through reform. To begin with, it looks for thresholds of technological possibility. A new

technology makes possible new kinds of activity, whether in production, or monitoring, storing and analyzing information, or otherwise.
The way in which people and institutions seize on these possibilities
may reveal new potential for property regimes, which law can appropriate and advance. Shiller's proposal to draw on finance theory and
information technology to create new risk-sharing devices is such an
appropriation.' Another is Yochai Benkler's suggestion that opensource software innovations reveal new and untested potential for
decentralized production schemes for goods with low capital requirements and high human-capital requirements!,
The freedom-promoting approach also looks for constituencies
whose existing activity and aspirations would support a proposed reform. These may be present users of a new technology or production
arrangement. Alternatively, they may be populations presently deprived of capabilities by the lack of an appropriate property scheme.
The slum dwellers, whose participation in informal market activity de
Soto and his collaborators documented in Peru, are an example of this
second sort of constituency ° In either case, such a constituency can
play two roles. First, it can provide political support for proposed reforms. Second, it can serve an evidentiary function, as either its present activity-as among technologists-or its present deprivation-as
among slum dwellers-will demonstrate the potential significance of
the reform at issue.
In addition to technological and political opportunities, the freedom-promoting approach looks for neglected conceptual opportunities where the benefits of property regimes have not been extended to
domains where they have potential application. De Soto's reform proposal is a textbook example of this sort of conceptual extension. In
87
88
89

90

Heller, 2 Theoretical Inquiries in L at 79 (cited in note 5).
Shiller, The New FinancialOrderat 69-82 (cited in note 2).
See Benkler, 52 Duke L J at 1245-47 (cited in note 12).
See Part III.A.
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identifying circumstances where conceptual opportunities for expansion are also desirable, it is important to bear in mind the purposes of
a property regime. A freedom-promoting approach will seek opportunities to extend property rights in ways that secure and promote capabilities. This lodestone will lead to somewhat different results from an
approach that conceives of the benefits of property regimes chiefly or
exclusively in terms of, say, either Pareto efficiency or civic virtue. 9
A final dimension of the pragmatic aspect is attention to cultural
or ideological opportunities to reform property rights and corresponding social relations. In any reform project, people's understanding of
their existing interests and commitments, and the relative weights they
assign these, will be highly important. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one of the essential projects of the free-labor movement was to present a picture of human dignity that centered on the
excellence of free, productive activity and unconstrained exchange.9
This was in contrast to earlier aristocratic and quasi-feudal conceptions that identified physical labor and wage employment with dependence and dishonor, and implied a strong hierarchy unfavorable to
those who sold their own labor power.9 3 Today, value reorientation
continues. The Creative Commons project sponsors video-collage projects for schoolchildren, seeking to disseminate the idea that freedom
to "rip, mix, and burn" the existing artifacts of culture is an essential
dimension of creative expression in a digital age."' Both the free-labor
movement and the Creative Commons project must be understood
partly as efforts to reorient the values people understand to be at issue
in property reform, and so to re-inflect political and cultural debates
over reform.

91 See generally Amartya Sen, The Possibility of Social Choice, in Sen, Rationality and
Freedom65 (cited in note 13).
92 On the free-labor movement generally, see Eric Foner, Free Soil, Free Labor,Free Men:
The Ideology of the Republican Party Before the Civil War (Oxford 1970).
93
See Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution 77-92 (Knopf 1992)
(providing as an example that Benjamin Franklin turned down a position as a colonel because
colonels were supposed to be gentlemen and Franklin could not be one since he was, at that time,
still engaged in business); see generally Charles Loyseau, A Treatise of Orders and PlainDignities
(Cambridge 1994) (first published 1610) (Howell A. Lloyd, ed and trans) (specifying which individuals have the particular aptitude and capacity to attain either office or lordship).
94 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture: How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock
Down Culture and Control Creativity 282-86 (Penguin 2004). The example of the video-collage
workshops comes from a presentation by Lessig at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society,
Harvard Law School, May 2004.
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III. THE FREEDOM-PROMOTING APPROACH
AT WORK IN PROPERTY REFORM

A. From Possession to Right: Property as Social Inclusion
In this Part, I present recent proposals that converting customary
possession of land and chattels into legally cognizable ownership can
provide a keystone of economic and social development. I explain that
these proposals, exemplified in the thought of Hernando de Soto, are a
prime example of freedom-promoting reform. They are, nonetheless,
subject to attack from the perspectives of the anti-expropriation critique and the critique of productive relations. The freedom-promoting
approach to property reform helps to answer the critiques by illuminating the power of the proposed reforms to affect a wider range of
human capabilities than the conventional defense envisages.
1. De Soto's titling program.
The 2000 publication of Hernando de Soto's The Mystery of Capitar created a firestorm of attention, much of it enthusiastic.9 The book
was speculative, overly ambitious, and eccentric.n Nonetheless, it arose
from decades of empirical work on the challenges to economic development in the slum-cities of Peru,98 Haiti, and the Philippines, and it
contained an exciting promise: the reform of property regimes could
spur a near-revolution in economic dynamism and social mobility.9
The central empirical claim in de Soto's work is that the world's
urban poor are not profoundly materially deprived in the way that is
often imagined. While there are, indeed, trash pickers in Buenos Aires
and sidewalk dwellers in Mumbai, most dwellers in the slums of the
developing world possess small plots of land on which they have
erected modest homes. However, they lack legal title to these possessions. De Soto and his fellow researchers have estimated that poor
De Soto, The Mystery of Capital (cited in note 1).
See Robert J. Samuelson, The Spirit of Capitalism, Foreign Aff 205-08 (Jan/Feb 2001)
(noting de Soto's influence among economists but criticizing that he "strains too much").
97 For instance, de Soto begins a chapter on the wealth-creating power of capitalism with a
quotation from Ludwig Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,which appears to bear at
best an adventitious, semantic relation to his theme. De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 39 (cited
in note 1). He compares his focus on the "dead capital" of the urban poor to Michel Foucault's
famous decision to diagnose modem forms of sanity through a study of insanity. Id at 49. A
vague but persistent note of autodidactic prophecy recurs throughout the book.
98
These findings are much more robustly documented as to Peru in de Soto, The Other
Path (cited in note 1).
99 See de Soto, The Mystery of Capitalat 226 (cited in note 1) (arguing that "when people
have access to an orderly mechanism to settle land that reflects the social contract, they will take
the legal route" and thus gain upward social mobility).
95
96
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people in developing and postcommunist countries possess, but do not
legally own, real estate worth at least $9.3 trillion, or twice the '2000
level of the total money supply in circulation in the United States. n
The consequence of holding property without legal title is incapacity to take advantage of the usual economic and social benefits of
property. Informal possessors enjoy the use-value of their real estate,
but without legal title they can exchange it or use it as collateral only
within the local and informal networks of neighbors in which their
possession is recognized. The real estate possessed by the urban poor
is, in de Soto's evocative term, "dead capital": there are serious, if not
fatal, barriers to its circulation through mutually advantageous exchanges,101 and thus to its production of wealth for present and future
owners.
De Soto contends that the legal systems of developing countries
place such high hurdles before those who would convert their informal possessions to legal title that the possessors can hardly do so. For
instance, in the Philippines, an informal dweller on state-owned or
private urban land can purchase it legally only by forming an association with his neighbors and applying for a state housing finance program."' De Soto and his colleagues estimate that the process would
require 168 legal steps, involve fifty-three public and private agencies,
and take between thirteen and twenty-five years."n In such situations,
it is perfectly rational for slum dwellers to apply a standard discount
rate to their prospective income from ownership and conclude that they
are better off earning less money now in local and informal activity.
In light of these considerations, the imperative for reformers
would seem to be to create efficient means to convert possessory real
estate to legal property. The challenge, however, is more complex than
simply reducing the number of administrative steps toward the creation of formal property rights. As de Soto acknowledges, governments
in the developing world have intermittently and nominally embraced

100 Id at 35.
101 Id at 32 ("Nobody really knows who owns what or where, who is accountable for the
performance of obligations... or what mechanisms are available to enforce payment for services
and goods delivered. [As a result], there is little accessible capital, and the exchange economy is
constrained and sluggish.").
102 Id at 20.
at
103 Id. In Egypt, the same process would involve seventy-seven administrative procedures
thirty-one public and private agencies and take five to fourteen years-sufficient explanation in
terms of economic rationality for the decisions of 4.7 million Egyptians to build their homes
illegally. Id at 20-21. In Haiti, a dweller on public land who wants to purchase it from the government must first spend over two years completing sixty-five administrative steps gaining permission to lease the land for five years; continuing to purchase the land requires another 111
administrative procedures over some twelve years. Id at 21.
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that goal for more than a century." Certain of these policies, of course,

are the ones whose seemingly interminable procedures de Soto has
used to make his point that ownership is nearly inaccessible to the
poor. Others, however, have been less burlesque in their bureaucratic

tangles, yet have still failed.'5
De Soto contends that the fatal error in the unsuccessful programs
is failure to align new property titles with existing patterns of possession, that is, a false assumption that new titles can be written on a
tabula rasa. On the contrary, he insists, existing customs of possession
are elaborate and quite specific, and those who live by them will resist
attempts to create new legal rights that conflict with customary ones.
On this account, then, to succeed reformers must enshrine rather than
revise customary rights, thus drawing customary possession into the
formal asset markets from which participants in local, customary regimes are excluded.
2. Titling: the critiques and the freedom-promoting response.
The aim of de Soto's scheme is integration into a system of rights,
where membership means a set of capacities otherwise lacking. The
scheme is subject to two of the critiques of property: the critique of
productive organization and the anti-expropriation critique. Joel Ngugi
has recently made both points against de Soto and allied reformers, taking as his example a property-titling program in Kenya.' ° Ngugi contends that land registration schemes necessarily impose an authoritative
104 See id at 153-206 (arguing that these attempts have failed because the developing countries' governments operate under faulty assumptions such as that people take part in extralegal
markets to avoid taxes and that existing extralegal contracts can be ignored). As he does not
note, the same goal was a keystone of British economic reform in the colony of Bengal in the
very first years of the nineteenth century. That reform, like many that followed, is generally
regarded as a complete failure. The first major contemporary treatment of this scheme and its
intellectual backdrop remains the most important one. See Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Propertyfor
Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement (Orient Longman 1981). A fascinating
critique of the program from the perspective of a nineteenth-century utilitarian radical comes in
James Mill, The History of British India 515-20 (Chicago abridged ed 1975) (William Thomas,
ed) (noting, succinctly, that the British land reform project "has completely failed").
105 See de Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 165-75 (cited in note 1) (noting that constitutionally and legislatively backed mandatory property systems have failed in Peru as well as many
formerly communist states).
106 See Ngugi, 25 Mich J Intl L at 471 (cited in note 11). Ngugi's criticism, with its picture of
a liberal rights regime imposed from without on a communitarian society, put him in the tradition of Karl Polanyi, the great critical student of the rise of laissez-faire capitalism and its attendant claim of merely perfecting natural human relations. See generally Karl Polanyi, The Great
Transformation (cited in note 36). For a creditable update of Polanyi's thought in relation to
neoliberalism-with which de Soto is justly associated-see John Gray, False Dawn: The Delusions of Global Capitalism 12-14 (Granta 1998) (discussing the relevance of Polanyi's work in
the modern world).
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legal interpretation on customary practices. This interpretation in turn
reflects the specific vision of development that the reformers hold.
Such reform is therefore an inherently ideological project, and not
simply a matter of giving the law's imprimatur to extant and unproblematic custom. Ngugi contends specifically that in Kenya, the Blackstonian fee-simple tenure that was assigned the new owners in that
country's registration scheme significantly distorted traditional customs. For instance, the reform program assigned title to the male head
of each household, a rule that Ngugi asserts lacked a basis in Kenyan
custom. '°7
This argument forms the backdrop of Ngugi's application to Kenyan reform of the anti-expropriation critique and the critique of productive organization. On Ngugi's account, Kenyan reform redistributed considerable property rights to the influential and sophisticated
social groups that initiated and administered the reforms. In this respect, Kenyan reform was an instance of the opportunism envisioned
in the anti-expropriation critique. The reform also drew the new feesimple landowners into the economy of commodity production for
regional and global markets. Assignment of legal title took assets out
of the semicooperative social schemes of small communities in favor
of the abstract, self-interested relations of the market. Kenyan reform
thus also imposed a specific order of productive activity, as the critique of productive relations claims.
De Soto provides part of the answer to both critiques himself. The
response to the anti-expropriation critique is straightforward. As already noted, he makes it a cardinal point of his program, in contrast to
what he characterizes as failed efforts in the same vein, that reformers
must ensure that their titling programs closely track existing possessory rights. The extent to which this aim succeeds in any specific setting will be an empirical one; despite Ngugi's claim that such tracking
is impossible in principle, the critique will have any real bite only as to
particular applications, not as to de Soto's program in general.
De Soto also responds to the critique of productive organization.
He contends that most poor possessors of land and homes strive to
engage in market activity even without legal title, but are relegated to

See Ngugi, 25 Mich J Intl L at 487 (cited in note 11). Ngugi also contends that de Soto's
forecasts of dramatic changes in actual economic activity following titling are not empirically
supported-a claim that Ngugi's cursory discussion does nothing much to resolve. See id at 526
(stating that the experience of registering land in Kenya indicates that "processes [imagined] to
be 'merely technical' in fact "usher in unanticipated economic and political responses" rather
than "translate into economic consequences in a unilateral fashion").
107
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informal or "shadow" economies by their lack of legal title." Therefore, the formalization of title does not induce a new form of life, but
rather advances projects and aims that informal possessors already
seek to pursue. Where people already aspire to participate in a particular order of productive relations, observing that a reform enables them
to do so is hard to characterize as an incisive critique of the reform.
To the extent all this is true, it is a substantial response. Nonetheless, there is more to say. The freedom-promoting perspective helps to
identify and articulate the terms of a fuller response than de Soto's. By
virtue of his narrowly economistic picture of the capabilities that
ownership is meant to provide the new owners, de Soto invites the
critique of productive relations. De Soto's image of the integration of
the urban poor into a national and global scheme of asset and capital
exchange is a celebrator's-or apologist's-mirror image of the unfriendly picture sketched by critics of the implications of marketoriented property schemes for the organization of production. De
Soto's self-restriction to these terms is a symptom of his intellectual
isolation from the freedom-promoting tradition in law and political
economy.
A fuller defense of a program such as de Soto's would not focus
exclusively on the very real capabilities that arise from the legal power
to enter into national and global market relations. Instead, a fuller
defense would also attend to the full complement of capabilities, many
of them subtler but no less valuable than market access, that ownership offers. The move from possession to ownership can mean a passage from profound vulnerability to at least partial autonomy and
command of reciprocity. For instance, slum dwellers who possess what
they do not own are vulnerable to expropriation or destruction of
their holdings at the whim of government officials and the wealthy
citizens whose bidding those officials typically do. They occupy relatively subordinate and vulnerable positions in relations with betterestablished members of society. In both respects, uncertainty and subordination tend either to perpetuate inherited hierarchies or to produce and reinforce new ones.
A properly designed and executed property scheme may indeed
constrain new owners in their choice of productive activities. At the
108 This contention is more impressively documented than most aspects of de Soto's position; in his earlier book The Other Path, de Soto presents the results of extensive empirical studies of informal markets in Peru. See de Soto, The Other Path chs 2-4 (cited in note 1) (studying,
inter alia, the Peruvian black markets for housing, trade, and transportation).
109 See Kalpana Sharma, Rediscovering Dharavi:Storiesfrom Asia's Largest Slum xx-xxxviii
(Penguin 2000) (outlining the development and growth of a group of ghettos in Dharavi). See
also generally Rohinton Mistry, A Fine Balance:A Novel (Knopf 1996).
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same time, however, it may contribute to their emancipation from a
variety of subtle and overt constraints on their freedom, which go well
beyond inhibitions on free exchange and investment-which are at
bottom only powerful tools for the promotion of capabilities. One
must have the full range of freedoms and constraints in view to make
an appropriate criticism-or defense-of property-reform programs.

From this broad perspective, de Soto's proposal presents alternatives
akin to those that structured Adam Smith's argument: on the one
hand, a society of relative vulnerability and incapacity; on the other
hand, a society of relative security and capability. De Soto's isolation
from the freedom-promoting tradition impoverishes his account of his
program and allows his critics rather too simple a line of attack, when
more subtle considerations should inform both sides of the debate.
This is not the place for a full evaluation of de Soto's work. The
view that expansion of rights in real property can enhance freedom
should not be hostage to the eccentricities or limitations of a single,
highly visible figure. In presenting de Soto's position, I have intended
as much as anything to sketch a kind of expansion of property, concerned with converting potential assets to legally cognizable assets,
and thus enabling newly titled owners to operate legally and economically as they could not otherwise do. I have also intended to show how
much the full scope of the freedom-promoting tradition can contribute to the proper formulation and evaluation of such a program.
Even at its best, however, such a scheme has two distinct limitations. First is Mark Twain's famous remark that land is no longer being
manufactured. There are inherent limits on a program based on allocation of a finite resource. Second, freedom to enter into market relations produces vulnerability as well as capacity: it means being subject
to the sometimes devastating vagaries of markets, whose power to
wreck economies and lives seems to grow with their scale."0 It is with
these two points in mind that I turn to a second model of freedompromoting property reform, one intended to mitigate the vagaries of
markets, and which is much less reliant on a limited stock of physical
materials.

110 See Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and Its Discontents 89-165 (Norton 2002) (discussing
the economic hardships created by the forced inclusion of Asia and Russia in the global economy); A Decline Without Parallel,Economist 26-27 (Mar 2, 2002) (chronicling the political and
economic distress in Argentina); Richard Borsuk, Jay Solomon, and Darren McDermott, Shock
Waves: Indonesia Falls Prey to Hoarding,Loss of Public Confidence, Wall St J Al (Jan 9, 1998)
(reporting on Indonesia's economic troubles, including the drastic fall in the rupiah).
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B.

Property, Risk, and Freedom
In this Part, I present Robert Shiller's proposal to distribute risk
through complex contractual arrangements. This proposal would enhance capabilities by diminishing the inhibition that structural shifts in
the economy impose on vocational choice through their exogenous
effect on long-term income. I argue that Shiller's proposal also answers two critiques of property. It responds to the critique of productive relations by showing how intensified property rights can provide
more, not less, choice among vocations, that is, among kinds of productive activity. It answers the anticommodification critique by showing
how intensified commodification of personal attributes can strengthen,
not diminish, the bases of social solidarity.
1. Shiller and the critique of productive relations.
In his 2003 book, The New Financial Order,'" Shiller provides a

summa of more than a decade of work on the analysis and management of risk. Shiller seeks to identify and promote new ways to remedy the most significant constraints on freedom in an era of free labor."2 That is, he aims to complete Smith's project of promoting
autonomy through self-ownership by addressing the points where that
project fails on its own terms. Shiller's starting point -on an uncharacteristic note for a mainstream economist-is Karl Marx's central observation about the free-labor economy:
[P]eople's ability to earn income by selling their own labor in a
free market is ultimately determined by what they can contribute
to the production process. Changes in their ability to earn income
from their efforts are thus fundamentally tied up with changes in
the technology of production.
[T]he dilemma people face [is] that their labor is essentially worthless when not combined with other factors and thus that their incomes are at the mercy of others who have access to these factors."3
This is, of course, the heart of the critique of productive organization: private property and market relations restrict our choices of productive activity even as they make new choices possible. According to
III

Shiller, The New FinancialOrder (cited in note 2).
Id at ix ("Application of these ideas will not only help reduce downside risks, but will
also permit more positive risk-taking behavior, thereby engendering a more varied and ultimately more inspiring world.").
113 Idat32,34.
112
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Shiller, this dilemma becomes more severe in proportion to the dynamism of the economy: the rate at which new technologies eclipse old
ones, industries cross borders to take advantage of inexpensive labor,
and economic life otherwise rearranges itself to allocate resources to
their highest-value uses."' This acceleration affects individuals' ability
to earn income-and to exercise their talents in productive or satisfying fashion-in two ways. Most simply, structural changes in the economy- those that make steelworkers or electronics engineers obsolete,
for instance, or depress real wages for manufacturing jobs-represent
exogenous shocks that reduce the employment prospects, wages, and
mobility of whole sectors of the population. More subtly, recognition
of uncertainty inspires risk-averse career decisions: to borrow an example of Shiller's, a college graduate considering whether to undertake graduate training in a highly specialized area of biotechnology
confronts an enormous upside akin to the experience of top-flight
computer programmers in the 1990s, contingent on the oft-predicted
explosion of biotechnology industries; but she also faces the prospect
of over-credentialed obsolescence imposed by some unpredictable
wrinkle in technology development or industry structure. " ' Facing a
significant downside with no way to hedge against it, she is likely to
forgo the risky course.
Such uncertainty diminishes freedom in at least two ways. First,
by inducing risk-averse decisions like that of our hypothetical biotechnician, the risk of exogenous shocks narrows the domain of viable
alternatives from which people choose their life paths. To be denied
viable alternatives is to be restricted along an important dimension of
freedom. Second, the risk-averse decision to avoid specialization, multiplied over a generation of decisionmakers, will affect the arc of technological and economic development. It may prevent advances that
would otherwise have occurred. Such advances would increase the
capabilities of everyone who benefits from a new technology; where
the advance does not take place, neither does the enhancement of
capabilities. "'
Shiller's response to these problems is a refinement in the technologies of risk management. Pooling risk to limit the effect of misfor114 See generally id. For discussions of this phenomenon in a global economy, see Thomas L.
Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree: UnderstandingGlobalization (Anchor 2000); William Greider, One World, Ready or Not: The Manic Logic of Global Capitalism (Simon & Schuster 1997).
115 See Shiller, The New FinancialOrder at 107-13 (cited in. note 2).
116 See Sen, Markets and Freedoms at 501 (cited in note 13). I discuss this issue more systematically in Jedediah Purdy, Efficiency, Freedom,and Degradation:Normative Standpointsfor
Evaluating Technological Innovations (unpublished manuscript on file with author) (arguing that
Sen's capabilities approach is the best lens through which to evaluate technological developments).
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tune on individuals, from the corporation to the insurance industry to
public financing of health care, is an exemplary modern advance in
security-and so also in freedom, in the capabilities sense.1'7 Risk pooling, however, is dogged by the problem of moral hazard-the tendency for insurance to affect the behavior of the insured in ways that
increase the likelihood of the bad outcome the insurance protects
against, by reducing the consequence of that outcome for the insured
individual. Moral hazard has seemed particularly threatening in the area
of income supports, the kind of insurance that would protect a steelworker or biotechnologist against adverse exogenous shifts in employment prospects. With a guaranteed income support, the insured has incentive to find a low-stress, low-paying job, collect her income-insurance
check, and devote her energies to pursuits other than employment.
The mechanism Shiller proposes to solve this problem is a new
form of index that would track increases and decreases in income not
for the insured individual, but for the relevant employment sector:
biology Ph.D.s, genetic specialists, patent attorneys, physical therapists,
and so forth. An individual's claim on an insurance pool would depend
not on a decrease in her individual income, but on a decrease in the
income of her sector." The mechanism for applying such an index
could take several forms. The prospective student might take out loans
whose repayment rate would fall with a decline in the sector for which
she was trained, but rise with the health of the sector, so that the lender
would effectively be investing in the future earnings of that sector.
More ambitiously, members of different sectors might hedge against
exogenous shocks to their sectors by investing in other sectors, so that
a pool of patent attorneys might contractually commit to contribute a
share of income in excess of ex ante expectations to making up any
deficit relative to ex ante expectations in the income of a pool of biotechnologists, and conversely."9 The level of ex ante expected income
would be set by the market in such contracts. In effect, each investor
in such an insurance pool would be using her own perceived earning
potential as collateral to secure a claim on the earning potential of
those in different areas of the economy, thus reducing the vulnerability of her income to structural changes beyond her control. The aggregate character of the income measure would avert the problem of
117 This is to be contrasted sharply with the "ownership society" policies recently promoted
by the current Bush administration, which are marked by a commitment to reconcentrating risk
in individuals and families. See, for example, Robert B. Reich, What Ownership Society?, American Prospect (online edition) (Sept 2, 2004), online at http://www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?
section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleld=8447 (visited Sept 18,2005).
118 Shiller, The New FinancialOrder at 110-20 (cited in note 2).
119 Id.
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moral hazard: no one person's deliberate reduction in income could
meaningfully increase her claim on the insurance pool, as it would not
perceptibly affect the governing index.12

I have argued that Shiller's proposal would advance freedom understood as capabilities by addressing one of the signal limitations of a
free-labor economy: the vulnerability of the individual with property
in her own talents and energy to structural shifts in labor demand.
Shiller's scheme is thus a significant attempt to remedy one of the critiques of property that I discussed in Part I.C: the critique of productive organization.
2. Shiller and the anticommodification critique.
Shiller's proposal also responds to the anticommodification critique of property. That critique identifies the expansion of property
rights with the growth of atomistic and instrumental conceptions of
personhood. Shiller's program shows how intensified commodification
of persons could have just the opposite effect: the promotion of social
solidarity.
Let us begin with the characterization of Shiller's program as one
in property. It is an elementary premise of the economic theory of
property that one of the independent variables affecting the density
and refinement of property rights is the cost of delineating and monitoring a unit of property. 2' The boundaries of a representative unit of
property, on this account, will fix at the point where the benefits of
propertization are equal to the costs of definition and monitoring. If
definition and monitoring were costless, efficiency gains
would dictate
1
rights.'
property
of
set
finer-grained,
or
an intensified,
120 Id at 112-13. This form of privately contracted income insurance is one of a variety of
mechanisms Shiller proposes. Among the most ambitious is an imagined contract between countries or pools of countries, in which the sovereigns would commit to future payments based on
their levels of economic growth relative to ex ante expectations. Id at 175-85. The scheme would
enable a wealthy but aging country, such as Germany, to plan some of its future pension payments around returns from the aggregate growth of, say, the countries of South and Southeast
Asia, while insuring those countries against disappointing performance or, most pertinently,
massive exogenous shock. Such an arrangement would, for instance, have cushioned the Southeast Asian countries against the devastating effects of the 1997-1998 financial crisis, which
brought massive unemployment and, in the case of Indonesia, a corresponding political crisis
whose consequences are still unfolding. I want to focus on the model of privately contracted,
aggregate income insurance, however, both for reasons of economy and because it is potently
related to the theme of property and freedom.
121 See Smith, 31 J Legal Stud at 462-67 (cited in note 13); Terry L. Anderson and PJ. Hill, The
Evolution of Property Rights:A Study of the American West, 18 J L & Econ 163,164-68 (1975).
122 It is helpful to bear in mind the limitations of such purely demand-driven accounts of
the creation and reform of property rights, which neglect the collective-action problems associated with creation and enforcement of new regimes. For a succinct expression of these concerns
and discussion of ways of integrating governance models into the analysis, see Katrina M.
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From this perspective, Shiller is describing a technological innovation that substantially reduces the monitoring costs for a unit of
property in an individual's future earnings. The difficulty of such
monitoring has historically pressed the propertization of productive
labor in the direction of either units of present time-typically
hours-or units of labor, whether dresses sewn or manuscripts produced. There was scant movement toward enabling one person to buy
a share of another's future earnings at a price reflecting present expectations. When imagined, such schemes were typically set aside as
morally distasteful, no doubt because of the difficulty of imagining
of activity.3
that they could work without fine-grained monitoring
Shiller's innovation solves the monitoring problem by moving not
closer to the individual through fine-grained monitoring, but farther
from her by relying on aggregate measures of shifts in sectoral in2 The effect is a new potential to treat earnings expectations as
come."'
presently fungible property at relatively modest monitoring cost. The
"holder" of the expectations can exchange them for value and thus
contractually take advantage of present potential by purchasing some
protection against future misfortune. Without such propertization, potential remains only potential, an insubstantial point of contrast with
actual outcomes, which makes intelligible that cruelest assessment, that
one has "a great future behind him."
How does this scheme address the anticommodification critique?
That critique, recall, holds that the commodifying of human talents
and energies undermines social solidarity and other nonmarket bonds
by "crowding out" intimate relationships or training people to regard
others as investments and opportunity costs, blunting the moral and
emotional apprehension of them as human beings like oneself. It is
true that a certain kind of commodification of persons- exemplarily
that of free-labor reform-can be regarded as having this effect. My
attempt to show the moral depth and social complexity of what reformers such as Smith aimed to accomplish does not negate this point.
The ambition of free labor was to break people out of oppressive
status relationships. The theoretical corollary to this aim was a picture
of the rights-and-interests-bearing person as distinct, integral, and in
certain respects potentially self-sufficient. ' 2 Such emancipatory docWyman, From Fish to Fur: Reconsidering the Evolution Toward Private Property (unpublished
manuscript on file with author).
123 See Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom 103 (Chicago 1962) (describing a similar
scheme for education, in which the lender would "buy" a share in the student's future earning
prospects, and stating that such schemes "are economically equivalent to ... partial slavery").
124 Shiller, The New FinancialOrder at 109-10 (cited in note 2).
125 Richard Ick has offered a fascinating argument that social contract theory derives from
the theory of international relations, and that the model of the agent supposed in contractarian
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trines tend to have hard edges: they are meant to break things, specifically, embedded and oppressive relationships.
Shiller's program is different in one critical respect. It promotes
an image of the individual not as the sole mistress of her talents and
her fate, but rather as vulnerable to a variety of social and economic
forces that she cannot control. Taken together, an emphasis on the
pervasive power of risk to redirect life-paths; a valorization of institutions that can mitigate such risk; and the literal intertwining by contract of the long-term fates of otherwise disconnected persons present
a very different picture of personhood and society from that of the
stereotyped, atomized individual of the liberal economy and polity.
From the standpoint of freedom-enhancing risk reduction, each person is an initiative taker, but is also profoundly vulnerable. Her talents
are her own, but she best realizes them by agreeing to share their
fruits with others, and in turn to take a share of those others' weal or
woe. Her freedom, in other words, is tied at every point to the freedom
of others, and the tighter (in this respect) her bonds with them, the
freer she is. Autonomy and solidarity are mutually reinforcing, because only solidarity enables people to resist the coercion, not of other
individuals, but of enormous and anonymous shifts in the operation of
economic life. Smith's definitional reform of property rights sought to
promote a life immune to the arbitrary and vindictive will of others.
The latest step in such a program would promote immunity to the
economic tectonics that are the whimsical and cruel Fates of our time.
Let me be very clear about what I mean to argue here. My point
is not that the fact of being joined in risk-sharing pools with others
increases the sentiment of solidarity, so that we feel essentially aligned
with other members of, for instance, our health maintenance organization. This would be a psychologically implausible claim, to say the least.
I mean rather that the kinds of social arrangements we make to manage risk teach lessons about how we can reasonably expect our lives to
go, and also about the kinds of beings we are. A society that ignores
risk, assuming that everyone gets what she deserves, imparts a vision
of the person as mistress of her fate, subject only to her own lack of
will or merit. A society that makes elaborate provisions for risk, which
in both their rationale and their operation acknowledge that we are
deeply subject to forces we do not individually control, teaches a lestheory is in fact an image of the state as an actor. See Richard Tuck, The Rights of War and Peace:
Political Thought and the InternationalOrderfrom Grotius to Kant 8-9 (Oxford 1999) (arguing
that sovereign states interacting in the domain of international relations provide a "real and
imaginatively vivid example" of the "liberal agent" or "wise man" of ancient and Renaissance
moral philosophy, who "will eliminate from his personality many of the features which we regard
as familiar-such things as passions, desires, and intellectual commitments").

1278

The University of Chicago Law Review ,

[72:1237

son of inevitable interdependence, in which only solidaristic measures
can protect individuals from merciless buffeting. Such lessons cannot
address the deepest concern of the anticommodification critique: they
cannot induce us to govern our relations by love. They can, however,
teach us to regard our prospects as essentially tied to those of others,
and to regard solidaristic policies that spread risk as the best response
to this obdurate feature of our circumstances. This is a substantial response to the claim that commodification robs relations to others of
value by making us self-owners -selfish, self-seeking, and indifferent
to the wellbeing and concerns of others.
C. The "Copy Left" and the Freedom-Promoting Approach
Legal scholarship's most explicit and ambitious engagement with
the political economy of freedom is in debates over the future of intellectual property. In this Part, I explain how the agenda of the "copy
left" intellectual property reformists advances two dimensions of
freedom: the capability to participate in the democratic debate of an
increasingly visual culture and the capability to influence the technological and social structures that, in turn, frame individuals' choices
among forms of productive activity. I also argue that recognizing the
common cause between "copy left" scholars and activists and the freedom-promoting tradition in property would help participants in this
and other areas of reform to understand themselves not just as disparate tinkerers and malcontents, but as a movement.
The debate over intellectual property as a problem of freedom
has recently gained new visibility with the appearance of Yochai
Benkler's important work on the political economy of peer production and the publication of Lawrence Lessig's Free Culture.2' The body
of freedom-oriented intellectual property scholars has been branded
the "Copy Left" by the New York Times Magazine, ever a reliable observer and creator of cultural currents.
Several distinct conceptions of "freedom" inform intellectual
property debates.'2' Lawrence Lessig's treatment of copyright law in
126 See Lessig, Free Culture (cited in note 94) (criticizing the expansion of intellectual property
rights at the expense of the public domain); Benkler, 52 Duke L J at 1254-460 (cited in note 12).
127 See Robert S. Boynton, The Tyranny of Copyright?,NY Times Mag 40 (Jan 25,2004).
128 As James Boyle presents the question,

The assumption is that [upon appropriate reform] we will return to a norm of freedom, but
of what kind? Free trade in expression and innovation, as opposed to monopoly? Free access to innovation and expression, as opposed to access for pay? Or free access to innovation and expression in the sense of not being subject to the right of another person to pick
and choose who is given access, even if all have to pay some flat fee? Or is it common ownership and control that we seek, including the communal right to forbid certain kinds of
uses of the shared resource?

2005]

A Freedom-PromotingApproach to Property

1279

Free Culture chiefly addresses the cultural and political stakes of "se-

miotic democracy,' '. 9 or, in the formulation I prefer, free speech for a
visual age. The rise of sophisticated and inexpensive digital technology
enables individuals to "rip, mix, and burn" visual elements of the
common culture for satirical, editorial, or simply expressive purposes.
The same technologies, however, also facilitate monitoring by copyright owners to block newly possible expressive uses. Conjoined with
expanded copyright protection, these developments mean that people
are prohibited from exercising substantial capabilities they would otherwise enjoy, that is, their expressive and political freedom may be
significantly restricted.
The capability to join in the hurly-burly of visual culture is all the
more important because of the continuing movement of American
popular and political culture from verbal to visual expression. One has

only to read Abraham Lincoln's career-making address on slavery and
the Constitution at New York City's Cooper Union-a text that reads
today like an uncommonly articulate law review article, but which ele-

vated Lincoln to stardom in the young Republican party-to understand how much has changed. ' 30Such a speech would today be impossible, while the manipulation of spectacle

-witness

President George

W Bush's then-popular but ill-fated arrival on an aircraft carrier under the banner proclaiming "Mission Accomplished,' '3' Michael Dukakis's devastating ride in a tank,'32 or Bush's facial expressions during
the first presidential debate of the 2004 general election' 3 -is the

common currency of politics.
Boyle, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 58 (cited in note 3).
129 The term is attributed to the cultural theorist John Fiske, and is now in wide currency in
discussions of intellectual property and politics. See Jack M. Balkin, DigitalSpeech and Democratic Culture:A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the DigitalAge, 79 NYU L Rev 1, 3 (2004)
(arguing that digital technologies alter the social conditions of speech and therefore the focus of
free speech theory should shift from protecting the democratic process to a larger concern with
protecting and promoting a democratic culture). For a critical view of such theories of the public
domain from a postcolonial perspective, see Anupam Chander, The Romance of the Public Domain, 92 Cal L Rev 1331,1334-35 (2004):
By presuming that leaving information and ideas in the public domain enhances "semiotic
democracy"-a world in which all people, not just the powerful, have the ability to make
cultural meanings, law turns a blind eye to the fact that for centuries the public domain has
been a source for exploiting the labor and bodies of the disempowered-namely, people of
color, the poor, women, and people from the global South.
130 See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Cooper Institute,New York City, in Abraham Lincoln:
Speeches and Writings 1859-1865 111 (Library of America 1989) (Don E. Fehrenbacher, ed).
131 See Jim Rutenberg, The Ad Campaign: Kerry Invokes Bush's CarrierLanding to Emphasize Points, NY Times A18 (Nov 11, 2003).
132 See Frank Rich, How Kerry Became a Girlie-Man,NY Tunes sec 2 at 1 (Sept 5,2004).
133 Patrick E. Tyler, The 2004 Campaign:Global Reaction'As the World Watched the Debate,
Some Saw a New Race, NY Times sec 1 at 34 (Oct 3,2004).
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Although I have my worries about the desirability of this change,

my point is not to tell a tale of decline, but to point out how the
change affects the cultural stakes of intellectual property. In an age of
visual politics, the ability to use clips of presidential television appearances, musical soundtracks, ad logos or advertising slogans, and other
rip-and-mix materials for political and cultural commentary is as essential as free access to the dictionary was for pamphleteers in the
eighteenth century. Review the widely watched satirical video of
'31

young lovers
George W. Bush and Tony Blair as mutually enamored

or Jon Stewart's collage of President Bush's statements on foreign pol-

icy in 2000 and 2004 in an acrimonious debate between Bush the isolationist and Bush the Wilsonian expansionist,' and consider what it
would mean for the satirists to lack access to these materials. What if
King George had owned the words "tyranny" and "liberty," and the

American colonists had been obliged to proceed in their pamphleteering without these and other essential terms? (Indeed, what is censorship but a crude and often brutishly enforced form of semiotic monopoly?)
Ripping and mixing changes the structure of cultural production
from one in which a few companies produce spectacles that everyone
else consumes, to one in which many decentralized creators vie with
each other for the attention of many disparate audiences. The result is

not a Habermasian Enlightenment salon, nor one of the idealized town
meetings of deliberative democracy.'6 It is, however, less hierarchical and
centralized than the present arrangement.
It is also, perhaps, less likely to train its audience in passivity, as
each viewer is also a potential creator and commentator. That is a democratic advance in the tradition of free speech, even if it has less to
134 The video clip, accompanied by the song "Endless Love," is available online at
http://www.snapsandbytes.co.uk/video38.html (visited Sept 18,2005).
135 The clip from The Daily Show, included in a presentation by Larry Lessig at the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School, is available online at http://
www.fisarein.comvideos/tvcips/dailyapri2003/4-28-03-bushvbush-sm.mov (visited Sept 18, 2005).
The use of "Wilsonian" is relatively standard in referring to the ambition of remaking the world's
polities in a liberal, democratic, and capitalist image, but I am specifically indebted to Walter
Russell Mead, Special Providence: American Foreign Policy and How It Changed the World
(Knopf 2001) (arguing that American foreign policy over the past two centuries has succeeded
astonishingly well, and identifying four schools of thought-the Hamiltonian (protection of
commerce), Jeffersonian (maintenance of a democratic system), Jacksonian (populist values,
military strength), and Wilsonian (moral principle)-that have interacted to produce better
policy than any single one would have achieved alone).
136 See generally Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement
(Belknap 1996) (outlining ways in which fractious democratic societies deliberate complex and
divisive issues); Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society (MIT 1989) (Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence,
trans) (describing the development and decline of "the public sphere").
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do with systematic presentation and assessment of reasons than with
the opportunity of ordinary citizens to portray the emperor unclothed.
The model wielder of this liberty, the "paradigm case," is the skeptical
and creative citizen who refuses to have his cultural field defined by
CNN, CBS, and FOX News. The appropriative artist is, in archetypal
spirit, what the poacher once was: a populist hero defying the prerogatives of Enclosure. Free speech, one is reminded, has a pair of complementary functions. On the one hand, it contributes to the structural
integrity of democracy by permitting the open vetting of issues and personalities; on the other hand, it makes possible the existence of a certain
kind of citizen: iconoclastic, self-confident, willing to play David to the
nearest Goliath. The interest of "semiotic democracy" spans both dimensions: democratic functioning and democratic personality.
This idea of democratic personality evokes an antidomination
note in Lessig's conception of freedom. He draws a contrast between
free culture, in Boyle's sense of "[f]ree access to innovation and expression,' '37 and permission culture, that is, an intellectual property
regime in which rippers and mixers would need the permission of
owners to use cultural materials. ' 3 The choice of permission as the contrast to freedom indicates Lessig's special concern with the nonreciprocal, potentially dominating relationship between the owner of cultural material and the permission-seeker, whom the owner can exclude at her whim. The thrust of the idea is that one should not have to
ask permission to use a part of one's own culture. The spirit of this
claim is in the vein of antidomination.
A distinct set of concerns guides Yochai Benkler's discussion of
the social and economic potential of peer production technologies. For
Benkler, the main issue is freedom in the sense of a broader range of
viable alternatives among forms of productive activity. The range of
viable choices is substantially a product of the institutional and technological structure of production. Benkler contends that modern, industrial societies have voluntarily restricted themselves to hierarchical, spatially centralized forms of production-the model being the
capitalist factory-because the technologies of the industrial age
made this the most productive mode of organization. New technologies, however, may allow high levels of productivity alongside voluntary and decentralized production.3 9
How, in terms of capabilities, should one understand this new
possibility? Specifically, what could people do under an optimal peer

137
138
139

Boyle, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 58 (cited in note 3).
Lessig, Free Culture at 8, 192-93 (cited in note 94).
See generally Benkler, 52 Duke L J 1245 (cited in note 12).
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production scheme that would not be possible in hierarchical production? I would suggest a few candidates.
First is the capability to work out of inclination as much as out of
necessity. Achieving this would mean blurring the distinction between
work and leisure. Where that distinction is stark, we trade our time
and energy in work for a sum of satisfactions in leisure. The more we
find our satisfactions within our main expenditure of time and energy,
the less stark the distinction. The difference then diminishes between
the "work" activity in which we are not "fully ourselves," because we
do it to purchase "our own" time, and the activity in which we recognize ourselves as fully present and satisfied.
The second aspiration made achievable by peer production is the
capability to be generous without being self-sacrificing. Ever since
Aristotle identified the rich man's capacity for magnanimity as a justification of economic inequality, the idea has stuck that social arrangements are better, other things equal, if they enable people to
express generosity. This is so not because Aristotle's defense of inequality was entirely satisfactory (that version of generosity relies on
another's deprivation, after all), but because of the recognition that
generosity is a great virtue to be able to exercise." Participants in peer
production projects such as SlashDot"' are magnanimous: they meet a
need by the voluntary expenditure of their time and skill. They win in
return both the subjective moral satisfaction and the social esteem
that accompany the magnanimous spending of skill and resources. The
more peer production came to dominate important industries, the more
magnanimity could coincide with the basic motivation of self-support.
One might object that participating in production under a standard firm model has the same benefits: making a living by contributing to the production of something that, by the definitions of market
analysis, satisfies existing demand-that is, a (perceived and effective)
need. The response is phenomenological: you can't be magnanimous
on a chain gang. The psychology of magnanimity depends directly on
the voluntary character of the activity, which is why no defense of taxpaying as magnanimous has arisen to match Aristotle's defense of
inequality.
The third capability made possible by peer production is a profoundly democratic one: participation in the experimental, incremental
reorganization of basic collective activity-in this case, economic production. Because our institutional structures profoundly affect the set of
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 18-19 (Dutton 1911) (D.P. Chase, trans).
See http://slashdot.org (visited Sept 18, 2005) (hosting a collaborative news site maintained by 250,000 volunteers).
140
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viable alternatives from which we choose in shaping our lives, the capability to engage with and reform institutions is as important as any
more immediate capability: it is a sort of metacapability, as electoral
democracy is a metarule of political life. The more legal rules open up
experiments with peer production, the greater this democratic capability becomes; the more those rules foreclose experimentation, the more
this democratic capability is diminished.
Enhancement of capabilities; enhancement of the metacapability
to affect the scope of one's future capabilities; and aversion to domination, whether interpersonal or structural: these are eminently the
concerns of the freedom-promoting tradition in property thinking. To
say this, though, is to say that the "Copy Left" has already arrived-for
purposes of its fairly specific, local disputes- at the program I am trying
to revive. Does revival of the tradition, then, have anything to add?
I think it does, in three ways. First, recognition of the freedompromoting tradition counters a perception of idiosyncrasy, a certain
peninsular aspect that may seem to attach to the critical scholars and
reformists of the intellectual property world. "Copyright?" asks the
skeptic incredulously. "You mean you're the guys who think Negativland and 2 Live Crew are bulwarks of freedom?" To be able to answer
partly in terms of a tradition of political economy and legal reform, of
which the battle over the socially best uses of new information technologies is an emblematic part, is an aid not just to rhetoric, but also to
thought. This is the advantage Lessig pursues in adverting to the tradition of "free culture." The tradition of the freedom-oriented economy
steered by law is a formidable inheritance.
Second, the tradition of freedom-oriented political economy has
always understood that property rights are instruments for the promotion of capabilities and resistance to domination, not naturally fixed
categories. This insight is a kind of immunization against the perception that the movement to rewrite intellectual property rules is "antiproperty," or that the public domain the movement seeks to protect is
"the opposite of property."'4 2 Rather, the present debate over intellectual property falls squarely within the tradition of property thought.
Finally, recognition of the tradition means recognition of a common cause. Both traditions and movements rest partly on selfinterpretationsthat enable people to think of themselves as joined in a
coherent set of projects across space and time. Membership in a
movement or tradition is thus not a simple fact, but rather the product
of activity interpreted, which in turn inspires further activity in keep-
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See Boyle, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 50 (cited in note 3).
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ing with the interpretation. ' Proponents of the public domain, advocates of formal rights in slum dwellings, and architects of complex
risk-management contracts are not disparate public-policy eccentrics.
It might not be too much to say that they are part of a movement, if
only they could see themselves as such.
IV. THE CRITIQUES OF PROPERTY RECONSIDERED

In this Part, I return from specific reform programs to the more
abstract matter of the three critiques of expanded property rights. I
take the critiques in turn, arguing that the freedom-promoting approach
helps both to answer them and to identify cases where they have particular force.
A. The Anticommodification Critique
This critique contends that redefining resources as alienable
property, that is, as commodities, produces an instrumental attitude
that drains them, and activity connected to them, of qualitative meaning. The freedom-promoting standpoint has two large advantages in
confronting this sort of objection.
First, its emphasis on the variation in property regimes across
time and space highlights an empirical correction to the anticommodification critique: whether propertization of resources fosters an instrumental attitude toward them depends on both the structure of the
property rights themselves and on the cultural background of valuation of the resources that the rights govern. Imagining the contrary that an institution as broad as "property" must always and everywhere
have the same cultural and psychological significance-is a simple
lapse into institutional essentialism. It may be true that, other things
equal, commodification invites emphasis on the economic, instrumental value of the resources commodified. 4 Other things are almost
143 See generally Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins
and Spread of Nationalism (Verso rev ed 1991) (investigating the relationship between nationbuilding projects and the media); David Bromwich, A Choice of Inheritance:Self and Community
from Edmund Burke to Robert Frost (Harvard 1989) (arguing that the tension between self and
community-between individualism and public-mindedness-has been a motive for great writing from the end of the eighteenth century to the beginning of the twentieth); Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame 2d ed 1984) (arguing that the abandonment of Aristotelian teleology has rendered hollow moral discourse and practice in the
modem world).
144 The economist will credibly say in response that commodification only facilitates the
already-present ambition to extract economic value from the resource by removing impediments
such as overlapping rights or inalienability. For an example, see Ellickson, 102 Yale L J at 1315
(cited in note 13) (arguing that "land rules arise not so much from law as from customary
norms").
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never equal. The same commodified form of land tenure that John
Clare lamented is now, in a time of relative prosperity and a high estimation of open space, the basis of private land trusts and conservation
easements, by far the fastest-growing method of land preservation.' To
regard this innovation as an aberration, somehow "the opposite of
property," would be confused essentialism. ' Both enclosure and conservation easements are property in land, dependent on the law's
creation, delimitation, and enforcement of private claims on resources.
The form of the property institution is only the beginning of the
story: the rest comprises the ways that people already value the resource to which property claims apply, and what they accordingly want
to do with it. People can (1) create novel types of rights to pursue
their interests in the commodified resources and (2) use existing
property rights in novel ways. Both have happened in connection with
conservation trusts. Both are within the realm of property. To identify
property rights with cold-hearted instrumentalism is an analytic mistake both because property rights may be structured, for instance, to
support conservation as well as for other purposes and because property rights need not make cold-hearted exploiters of those who were
not already inclined to that attitude.'
The second advantage to addressing the anticommodification critique through the freedom-promoting approach rests on the way this
approach understands the social character of property. The image of
commodification as fostering an instrumental relationship to commodified resources rests on a specific image: of the bearer of property
rights as subject and the resource to which the property rights apply as
object, the passive vehicle of the right-holder's preference satisfaction.
This is, however, to overlook that property rights define how people
can recruit one another, and the resources they control, for collaborative projects. This is not (to put it in an overstylized way) a subjectobject relationship, but an intersubjective relationship. This relationship may be more or less reciprocal. It may tend to prerogative on one
145 See Julia R. Mahoney, Perpetual Restrictions on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88
Va L Rev 739, 742 (2002) ("The number of acres protected by conservation easements held by
private, nonprofit organizations increased from 450,000 in 1990 to 2.6 million in 2000.").
146 For an argument to this effect, see id at 743-45.
147 For a discussion of some ways in which property concepts are compatible with conservationist values, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Owning the Land: Four ContemporaryNarratives, 13 J Land
Use & Envir L 279, 302 (1998) (describing a property-ownership narrative in which property
rights are limited to using the land in its natural state and for its natural uses); Rose, 83 Minn L
Rev at 163--64 (cited in note 4) (analyzing environmental rights as "hybrid property" rights);
Carol M. Rose, Joseph Sax and the Idea of the Public Trust, 25 Ecol L Q 351 (1998) (discussing
the idea of the public trust-that at least some resources, such as waterways, are especially subject to public claims-and whether the public trust is property "owned" by the public).
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side and mere obedience on the other, or it may tend to relatively
symmetrical negotiation. ' 4 That is the proper focus of the inquiry as to
whether any particular instance of propertization produces an instrumental attitude toward other persons in particular.
Consider the free-labor property regime that Adam Smith advocated in light of this argument. The commodification of labor power making people the owners of alienable personal property in their time,
energy, and skill -represented a dramatic increase in reciprocity in the
social process of recruiting labor, relative to the hierarchical, deeply
conventional allocation of labor power in the quasi-feudal setting that
preceded this commodification.'49 In brief, this was so because under the
new regime people had to be induced, not ordered, to labor, and retained the option of exit-that is, putting down their tools and leaving.
This exemplary case contains a general point. Once property is
understood as forming, among other things, a set of social rules for the
recruitment of resources, it becomes clear that an extension or intensification of property rights need not tend in the direction of "instrumental" relations-not, at least, where any intersubjective exchange is
present." Where the change in the property regime imposes greater reciprocity in such recruitment, its effect will be counter-instrumentalizing:
it will require people to pay more, not less, heed to the interests and
commitments of others. This is the case, for instance, in the commodification of present earnings expectations that Shiller proposes. By reducing vulnerability to misfortune and expanding viable vocational
options, Shiller's proposal would make less common the unhappy
situation in which people must choose between a bad option and a
worse alternative. Where someone has multiple viable options, another who wishes to recruit her must appeal to something other than
her desire to avoid deprivation-for instance, a sense of vocation or
some other intrinsic satisfaction in the activity proposed. The need to
make this appeal moves the recruiting effort from substantial prerogative to substantial reciprocity.
If anything, the same change is more dramatically envisaged in de
Soto's proposed reforms, which would turn informal possessors, who
are always vulnerable to the threat of extralegal expropriation, into
legally protected owners who can use their assets as a bulwark against
coercion. With such a bulwark, it is possible to enforce at least a modicum of reciprocity in the appeals others can make to recruit one's resources and effort. Both commodifying reforms would require ap148 See Parts II.A-B.

See Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments at 61-66 (cited in note 47).
150 A pure relationship of person to land might be the exception.
149
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proaching others not only as means to one's own ends, but also as having ends of their own.
B.

The Critique of Expropriation

This critique contends that programs to extend or intensify property rights tend in fact to be asset-grabs by powerful social groups that
use newly created rights to claim resources for themselves or their allies.
Alas, the freedom-promoting approach to property has no power to
dissolve this problem."' However, the freedom-promoting perspective
does offset this problem, in part, by incorporating distributive considerations, not as side-constraints or ad hoc exceptions to avoid unhappy
results from its main principles, but as the heart of its criteria.
To understand this argument, consider the claims the antiexpropriation critique may bring to bear against property reform. The
critical claim cannot be simply that the creation of new property rights
provides an opportunity for unscrupulous and powerful groups to
augment their coffers and those of their friends. However lamentable,
this claim applies to any legal instrument that redistributes rights in
resources: nationalization, privatization, eminent domain, criminal
forfeiture, even adverse possession or homesteading rights. To observe
this is only to observe that power gives opportunity to cupidityhardly a new insight or a fine point of legal analysis. The claim must
rather be that something in the rationale or operation of reforms that
expand property rights obscures their opportunistic motives and inegalitarian results, so that property expansion is an instrument specially
suited to the theft of "the common off the goose."
How might this work? Imagine a de Soto-style program to assign
formal title to resources, which creates a highly inegalitarian initial
allocation of property. The titling scheme supersedes an informal possessory system that was considerably more egalitarian in distribution,
even though it displayed all the inefficiencies that de Soto identifies in
such systems. If the reform were justified on (somewhat simplistic)
economic grounds -say, that clear and enforceable property rights are
necessary to produce both static and dynamic efficiency in resource
use-then the inegalitarian effect might appear incidental to evaluat-

151 De Soto claims the conversion can take place without changing the allocation of resources. De Soto, The Mystery of Capital at 49-54 (cited in note 1). If de Soto is not flatly wrong,
he is at least describing the exceptional case. As I have explained, it seems more likely to me that
he is wrong: even converting informal to formal claims in the same claim-holders and over the
same spatial domains will have distributive consequences (although they may be egalitarian
consequences).
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ing the program. The rationale for reform would thus provide an effective apology for an expropriative reform."2

By contrast, the freedom-promoting approach would treat as central to its analysis the danger that an inegalitarian reform might rob
enough people of enough effective access to resources to leave them
with diminished capabilities. The freedom-promoting approach would

not take the efficiency advantages of the inegalitarian formal system
to justify the system by themselves: the question would be whether
they increased freedom overall. From the freedom-promoting standpoint, the informal but relatively egalitarian system would be preferred. Efficiency gains are attractive because, other things being

equal, they promote freedom, but they may come at the cost of reductions in freedom, and if the losses to freedom outweigh the gains, the
freedom-promoting approach will reject the reform.'53
The vital heart of the critique of expropriation is that propertyexpanding programs tend to confuse means-property rights-with
the end of promoting human welfare (which I think is better cast as

freedom). ' This confusion obscures the harm to freedom that can
come from property-based reforms that provide the efficiency benefits
of clear rights to resources while causing losses to freedom in certain
respects-for instance, through highly unequal distribution. An ap-

proach that concentrates clearly on the ends being pursued-the promotion of overall freedom, understood as capabilities-will keep attention on the right criteria. This is the best guarantee a reform-guiding
theory can provide against opportunistic use by rent-seeking elites.

C.

The Critique of Productive Organization
This critique contends that the expansion of property rights

draws those in whom the rights are vested into hierarchical, marketgoverned relations of production, and thus closes off any potential

opportunity to structure their productive activity according to other
152 This is, alas, not a fantasy. For a discussion of how property fundamentalism facilitated
inegalitarian (and, at least in the medium term, unproductive) privatization in Russia, see Stiglitz,
Globalizationand Its Discontents at 166-79 (cited in note 110).
153 I do not mean to say that all proponents of economic efficiency would prefer the inegalitarian arrangement to a more egalitarian allocation of formal rights; if they were nondogmatic,
they might well opt even for the informal system in my hypothetical, when confronted with the
choice. That, however, would be an ad hoc exception to the general pursuit of efficiency. The
reason to prefer the freedom-promoting standpoint is not that it "picks the right results" with
less jiggering than its stylized alternatives, but that it specifies the right reasons to consider in
evaluating any set of measures.
154 See Amartya Sen, Inequality Reexamined 39-72 (Harvard 1992) (distinguishing between
"functionings," or the wellbeing of a person measured in terms of the person's achievement, and
"capability," or the freedom to pursue different functions).
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criteria. This critique has bite today at the level of land reform, where
it is sounded by skeptics of Hernando de Soto's program,' and in critiques of the neoliberal privatization program at large. '
Only an institutionally essentialist view of what "property" is
would support the idea that the issue here is whether to be for or
against the expansion of property rights. The freedom-promoting perspective is a reminder that "commodification" has many faces. Property is no more a determinate system of increasingly concentrated and
hierarchical production than it is a relentless instrument of moral flattening or inegalitarian expropriation. The issue is rather what forms of
productive relations any particular scheme of property rights makes
possible, and which forms, if any, it excludes.
This theme is intimately related to the freedom-promoting approach's second response to the anticommodification critique of property: that property rules set the terms on which people can recruit one
another for joint projects, and thus direct social and economic interaction between the poles of reciprocity and arbitrary power. In the same
way, a scheme of property rights gives shape to production, which
emerges from the coordination of resources and activity among people. For example, the capitalist production characteristic of the industrial age in the noncommunist world is premised on (1) private ownership of the large and concentrated capital goods, such as factories, that
make production possible; and (2) free labor, that is, individual ownership and sale of time, energy, and talent. The consequence is that those
who wish to produce and be paid must offer to sell their labor to those
who hold the tools of production -the capitalists. From a basic allocation of private ownership follows a system of production: employees
contracting to spend their days and energies at work with the tools of
others -the factory system.
Of course, this story is too simple. First, the arrangement just
sketched could be vastly changed by purely distributive measures: the
factory could be owned by its employees; although the physical activity of production would be identical, and while legally it would be
identically premised on private ownership of capital goods and of labor, it would not reflect a division between a capital-holding class and
a laboring class. Second, the factory system reflects not just a legal
regime, but also a technological background: capital-intensive production of material goods in the last two centuries put the capital requirements of large-scale production outside the reach of independent
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See notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
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See generally Walden Bello, The Future in the Balance: Essays on Globalization and

Resistance (Food First 2001).

1290

The University of Chicago Law Review

[72:1237

or guild artisans and virtually required many workers to come together in a single factory. Moreover, the combination of many producers at work along, let us say, a single assembly line, requires a form of
labor discipline that will be hierarchical from the point of view of any
Bartleby or whimsy-chaser; the order to fall in line may come from the
owner or from the workers' management committee, but either way, it
must come. No arrangement of legal rights, no matter how fanciful,
could hope to overcome these features of production based on largescale and concentrated physical capital. A scheme of production,
therefore, results from a concatenation of technology, distributive politics, and property law. Identifying property law with a particular
scheme of production would not only be essentialist; it would also be
fetishistic, that is, it would imagine property law as exercising a more
nearly exclusive power over the structure of production than it does.
The fact remains, however, that property rights are an instrument
to seize the opportunity presented by a new technology: depending on
the shape property law takes, the technological potential for new productive relations may reach fruition or may go unrealized. Take the
case of the newly possible forms of peer production discussed earlier. "7
The promise of these activities, as Yochai Benkler has argued, is that
they might reconcile high productivity with individual autonomy in
the selection of productive activity. Their capacity to achieve this reconciliation depends on new technological possibilities. The productive
capital at work in these forms of peer production-networked computers-is no less productive when dispersed than when concentrated
in one location. Moreover, this form of production does not require
hierarchical organization to ensure productivity: dispersed, voluntary
use of networked personal computers gets the job done. '
Technology, however, is not fate. In any case, it is not all of fate.
Whether peer production emerges to realize the full technological
potential of the moment depends on the background of property law.
The most important resources for the peer-production arrangements
sketched above, other than dispersed capital, are the cultural materials
that voluntary producers draw on to make their contributions. For
peer production to proceed, these must be accessible, in the sense ei157 These sites are online at http://www.wikipedia.org/ and http://slashdot.org/ (visited Sept
18,2005). Perhaps most impressive for its utter non-triviality is the website that assembles a daily
newspaper out of thousands of surreptitious individual reports from North Korea-the only
possible semblance of a free press under a regime that would crush any such activity more spatially concentrated than peer production. Interview with Ethan Tucker, Fellow, Berkman Center
for Internet and Society, Harvard Law School (Apr 17,2004).
158 See generally Yochai Benkler, Sharing Nicely: On Shareable Goods and the Emergence
of Sharingas a Modality of Economic Production,114 Yale L J 273 (2004).
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ther of being unowned or in the more restricted sense that their owners cannot exclude potential users from access. Otherwise, peer producers will be communards without a common. The debate over the
future of intellectual property that I sketched in the earlier discussion
of Benkler's and Lessig's thought is pivotal in this question. Forms of
intellectual property law that ensure widespread access to cultural
resources will facilitate peer production; those that forbid the first will
significantly impede the second.
Therefore, either an industrial model or a peer-production model
of cultural activity will be a product not just of technology, but also of
politics and the legal rights that instantiate political outcomes. As
Boyle has pointed out, there is no "outside" of law, no "opposite of
property" in the assignment of legal rights."9 The question is whether
the boundaries of property rights are set so that they permit, say, the
Disney corporation to exclude peer producers and cultural innovators
from using its images and stories, or whether, alternatively, the company's rights are so bounded by time and nonowners' use-rights as to
prevent it from stopping novel uses of cultural resources.
To say that property rights promote hierarchical forms of production, therefore, is to overlook both the variety of forms that property
rights can take and, just as important, the variety of productive capital
(from factory machines to dispersed computing capacity) and resources (from natural raw materials to labor power to cultural goods)
that property rights may govern. The interaction of any specific scheme
of property rights with these other variables will shape the resulting
organization of production. By viewing property rights as flexible tools
that enable societies to seize technological opportunities for new productive relations, the freedom-promoting perspective helps to show that
there is no single relationship between property schemes and the organization of production, and also to identify those relationships that
are desirable from the standpoint of freedom.
V. ONE VIEW OF THE PURPOSES AND BOUNDS OF PROPERTY

I now address some objections to the argument I have made. The
purpose of this Part is to clarify some of the ambitions and limitations
of the argument so far, not to vindicate it against all comers. The objections I consider are, first, that my account of freedom is so broad
and encompassing as to be merely formal and thus useless as a guide
to practice or judgment; second, in quite a different direction, that my
account of freedom is imperial, in the sense that it threatens-or at

159 Boyle, 66 L & Contemp Probs at 29-30 (cited in note 3).
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least pretends-to override other values that also deserve respect;
and, third, that this account of freedom is so anthropocentric, so relentlessly focused on human capabilities and aspirations, that it neglects important nonhuman values such as the aesthetic or intrinsic
worth of the natural world, which also do and should shape property
regimes.
A. The Objection of Emptiness: Ranking and Distribution
Is the account I have given of freedom empty? To be sure, it does
not settle either of two essential questions. First, what interpersonal
distributive principle should apply in evaluating social states as more
or less free? Should it count against a property regime that it purchases a significant increase in the freedom of some with denial of the
freedom of others? Second, what ranking should apply among capabilities? Considering that people may have or lack an enormous variety of capabilities, from singing opera and playing polo to reading and
writing in their native language and participating in their government-or even to walking and talking-it is not clear how a focus on
capabilities should help us to assign priorities among these. The aim of
this project is to contribute to the evaluation of property regimes according to the states of affairs they bring about in social life, by asking
whether people under one regime are more or less free than they
would be under another, where freedom is evaluated by capabilities.
With neither a distributive nor a ranking principle, however, it seems
the project might be stuck at the level of mere description, observing
that certain people in one society are able to do certain things, while
others in another setting can do certain other things-a judgment that
could charitably be called unilluminating.
I begin with the ranking problem both because it is more amenable than the distributive problem to distinctive contributions from a
capabilities theory of freedom, and because a capabilities-oriented response to the ranking problem helps to address the distributive problem. Concern with promoting capabilities gives priority to two specific
classes of capabilities: what I call foundational capabilities and meta-

capabilities.Foundational capabilities are those on the basis of which
all other capabilities are exercised. Examples include physical mobility, linguistic capacity, literacy, and the ability to appear in public without shame. Deprivation of these capabilities is, perforce, deprivation of
all (or virtually all) others.
Metacapabilities are those that enable people to expand, refine,
or revise their existing capabilities, either by effort directed at themselves, or by changing the legal, cultural, or institutional context in
which they exercise their capabilities. Literacy, command of money, and
freedom from interference, for instance, would all be metacapabilities
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for purposes of making changes directed at oneself-say, learning a
new language by contracting for instruction. The capacity to participate
in self-government, by contrast, is a metacapability for revising one's
context. This might mean, for instance, gaining official recognition for
a language one already speaks, or legislatively mandating the construction of wheelchair ramps for the disabled.
As the examples suggest, foundational capabilities and metacapabilities are not mutually exclusive categories, and in many cases they
may overlap. They do, however, exclude large numbers of capabilities
that fall into neither class. Musical or athletic capacity, computer programming, auto mechanics, portraiture, legal training, and gardeners'
green thumbs represent a variety of significant human values; however,
they are neither necessary conditions for the development of other capabilities nor, in any distinctive degree, instruments for the revision of
one's capabilities. Because foundational capabilities and metacapabilities are basic to the development and exercise of capabilities generally,
a freedom-oriented perspective owes a special emphasis to capabilities in these classes.
Moreover, the most straightforward way to apply this emphasis in
concrete institutional decisions is in distributive terms -specifically in
the distribution of the resources that promote foundational capabilities and of political rights and other metacapabilities that promote
self-improvement and the revision of contexts. For instance, faced with
a choice between restrictive intellectual property rights that promoted
the production of entertainment in somewhat greater quantity than
otherwise, and more permissive rules that promoted widespread appropriation and commentary, an emphasis on metacapabilities would
lead one to prefer the latter. Deciding between a risk-management
regime on Shiller's model that increased access to higher education and
another regime that produced greater returns to economic "winners"
at the cost of more risk-averse educational decisions by others (resembling, perhaps, the present arrangement in the United States), an
emphasis on foundational capabilities would lead one to opt for the first.
It may appear that I am using an answer to the ranking problem
to smuggle in a partial answer to the distributive problem. I would concede that the distributive answer emerges from the ranking answer,
but would dispute whether "smuggling" is the right characterization of
the relationship. One well-established way of reasoning about distributive justice is to start from a picture of the kind of society one
wishes to promote, then proceed to specify the distributive scheme
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that would advance such a societyf A freedom-oriented normative

picture of social life envisions a society in which both foundational
capabilities and metacapabilities are widely held and exercised. That
such a picture has distributive consequences should be entirely unsurprising. There is, then, real content to the idea of a freedom-oriented

approach to property rights, although such an approach will almost
certainly interact with independent views about distributive justice
and the appropriate hierarchy of capabilities.161
B.

The Objection of Overreach

If the freedom-promoting approach is right, then it may seem to
raise quite a different problem. Perhaps the trouble with the approach
I have recommended is not that its conception of freedom is uninformative, but rather that it is too ambitious. The other prevalent
normative accounts of property, which focus on preserving negative
liberty and promoting economic efficiency, are pervasive and powerful.'6 The "positive freedom" accounts of property law as promoting

conceptions of personhood are also important. ' 6 Is an orientation to
freedom, understood as capabilities, intended to displace or encompass these well-established strands of thought? If so, is this ambition
even remotely credible? '6'
I do want to make a modest version of the extravagant claim that
the objection contemplates. The freedom-oriented approach to property is intended in part to redescribe the other approaches in ways

that diminish the impression of competition among them. This is not
intended as an exercise in normative monism. On the contrary, I suppose that there are deep and persistent conflicts of value both among

persons and within individual commitments. ' That said, however, the
freedom-oriented approach has some advantage in its power to capture aspects of the appeal of putatively competing approaches. In ad-

160 For the view that this teleological approach is the only meaningful way to reason about
distributive justice, see Macintyre, After Virtue chs 1-2 (cited in note 143).
161 For instance, there could be meaningful disagreement over how much weight to place on
the widespread achievement of foundational capabilities, or over whether certain rarefied skills,
such as rhetoric or filmmaking, should be regarded as important metacapabilities undergirding
cultural and political commentary. See, for example, Lessig, Free Culture at 25-26 (cited in note
94) (noting the importance of comics to Japanese culture as compared to the relative disdain
Americans hold for this kind of culture).
162 See notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
163 See note 23 and accompanying text.
164 This discussion represents an initial grappling with these questions. I anticipate a much
fuller discussion in a sequel, tentatively titled Persons as Resources and as Ends: Freedom, Dignity, and the Law of Property.
165 See notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
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dressing the economic efficiency account of property rights, the freedom-oriented approach adopts Sen's contention that we approve of
markets in large part because they promote freedom in two ways: by
securing people from interference in coordinating their activity, market rules protect the process aspect of freedom; and by allocating resources efficiently and increasing aggregate social wealth, they promote the opportunities aspect of freedom.'' Both aspects of freedom
ultimately redound to the measure of capabilities. ' Affirmative views
of property as a promoter of personhood also fit within the freedomas-capabilities approach: such views conceive of property as promoting a specific set of capabilities, which may be more or less consonant
with the freedom-oriented approach's emphasis on foundational capabilities and metacapabilities.
I do not mean to insist that the capabilities-promoting approach
to property can assimilate either the economic efficiency or the personhood approach without remainder; but it can express, and sometimes clarify, a good deal of what is attractive in each, suggesting that
the field of values bearing on property regimes may be less fragmented than conventional oppositions suggest. That said, I am not so
confident that the capabilities approach can substantially capture the
appeal of the aim of securing negative liberty. While it would no doubt
be possible, even straightforward, to redescribe negative liberty in
terms of what it enables people to do, whether the redescription
would be convincing as an account of what we value in negative liberty is less clear. Although this is not the place to pursue the phenomenology of negative liberty at any length, the appeal of the idea seems to
rest on a strong intuition about the integrity and inviolability of the
individual, not so much with promoting activity as with acknowledging
existence of a certain kind. Insisting that this commitment "really" has
to do with promoting capabilities is rather like redescribing religious
or romantic life in terms of self-interest maximization: while possible
as a formal matter, it rings false as an account of value, not least because the people whose commitments it purports to describe would be
unlikely' to accept the description as true to their experience of the
matter. 68
In some ways, the genuine plurality of values bearing on the
evaluation of property regimes softens the difficulty presented by the
first objection, the charge of emptiness. The contrast between promot166 See Sen, Markets andFreedoms at 501-02 (cited in note 13).
167 Id at 506 (discussing the "opportunity aspect" of freedom, which is that it "gives us the
opportunity to achieve our objectives [and is] thus, concerned with our actual capability to
achieve").
168 See Taylor, Sources of the Self at 3-4 (cited in note 75).
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ing capabilities and securing negative liberty suggests that no unified
evaluative calculus will be possible in principle. This conclusion finds
support not just in the contrast between promoting capabilities and
securing negative liberty, but also in the divisions within a capabilitiespromoting approach along the axes of both distribution and ranking,

and in the distinctive aspirations of the various personhood-promoting
conceptions. This point in turn suggests that the proper aim in assessing property regimes is to understand as clearly as possible the competing values of different normative standpoints, in both their overlap
and their points of genuine disagreement, and to state precisely the
sacrifices that pursuit of one value would require of others.'' Proceed-

ing in this way is, of course, entirely compatible with arguing for a particular normative approach, but it recognizes that a plurality of mutually irreducible considerations will structure the evaluative field.

C. The Objection of Anthropocentrism
I have less to say about the third objection, the charge of a narrow anthropocentrism. I hope that my response to the second objec-

tion has in some ways prepared the ground for this response. Just as a
plurality of expressly person-regarding (or, if one prefers, anthropocentric) values structures the evaluative field of property regimes, so
the distinct values that concern the nonhuman world will also make
their contribution to the puzzle.7 ° In principle, I see no greater diffi-

culty in this recognition than in the acknowledgement of competing
human-regarding values." The interest lies in understanding how peo169 For an example of such reasoning, see Michael Ignatieff, The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics
in an Age of Terror (Princeton 2004) (asking how to balance the interests of security and liberty
in the midst of a struggle against terrorism).
170 I have nothing to say here concerning the meta-ethical or ontological question whether
the value of the natural world is necessarily understood as a product of human valuation (aesthetic, religious, or otherwise) or subsists in itself and is simply apprehended by human beings.
For an argument of the first sort, see generally Christine M. Korsgaard, ed, The Sources of Normativity (cited in note 75) (examining four accounts of the source of normativity that have been
advocated by modern moral philosophers-voluntarism, realism, reflective endorsement, and the
appeal to autonomy-and showing how Kant's autonomy-based account emerges as a synthesis
of the other three). For the second view, see, for example, Arne Naess, Ecology, Community, and
Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy (Cambridge 1989) (David Rothenberg, trans) (reflecting on the
relevance of philosophy to the problems of the degradation of life conditions on Earth, and
rethinking the relationship between man and nature). The question strikes me, on Kantian
grounds, as essentially unanswerable from the human perspective, in which value is perceived as
"real for us," but also necessarily as perceived,that is, as real for us.
171 The perception that there is an essential, even an insurmountable difficulty here seems
to take its force from an idea that once value is identified with the human standpoint or human
interests, an unbridgeable gap is opened between human values and whatever value may be
regarded as inhering in natural phenomena. All is subsumed under the human will or human
self-interest maximization. This attitude has proponents on both the left and the right. See gen-
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pie have weighed these values against each other in practice, and have
reinflected some values in light of their relation to values of other
sorts. To do that question any justice would require an historical examination of ideas about the natural world and their relationship to
law generally and property regimes in particular.r'
CONCLUSION

The approach to property that I have defended here concentrates

on the promotion of freedom. Its conception of property is dynamic,
oriented to reform in the domain, intensity, and content of property
rights. Its conception of freedom centers on the development of capabilities, with special emphasis on expanding people's set of viable
choices and replacing relations of domination and subordination with
reciprocity. This approach is realistic, reformist, and attentive to the
interaction between on-the-ground reforms and general conceptions.
It expresses and gives new inflection to a tradition going back at least
as far as the Scottish Enlightenment.
Adopting this approach means not supplanting, but supplementing, the more conventional accounts of property's purpose. In this respect, the freedom-promoting approach is the very opposite of dog-

matic: it represents one region of a constellation of considerations that
bear on the evaluation, design, and reform of property regimes. However, adopting the freedom-oriented approach both enriches the de-

fense of property rights relative to major lines of criticism and helps to
clarify the proper limits of property regimes.
erally Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical
Fragments(Stanford 2002) (Gunzelin Schmid Noerr, ed) (Edmund Jephcott, trans) (suggesting in
1944 that modem Western society, rather than fulfilling the promise of the Enlightenment, sunk
into a new barbarism); Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for
Bioethics (Encounter 2002) (arguing that modem biotechnology debases, rather than celebrates,
human dignity). I have given some attention to this position over the years, and am unconvinced.
For an account of the irreducible plurality of moral experience and the interaction between
human-regarding and nature-regarding values, see Charles Taylor, Heidegger,Language,Ecology,
in Charles Taylor, PhilosophicalArguments100 (Harvard 1995);Taylor, Sources of the Self (cited
in note 75).
172 See generally William Cronon, Changes in the Land: Indians; Colonists, and the Ecology
of New England (Hill & Wang 2003) (explaining the effects European colonists' sense of property and their pursuit of capitalism had upon the ecosystems of New England); Roderick Nash,
Wilderness and the American Mind (Yale 4th ed 2001) (examining the history and evolution of
American attitudes toward nature). I take up some of these issues in the context of the law of
waste in Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine:A PluralistInterpretation, 91 Cornell L Rev (forthcoming 2005) (asking "what causal forces account for the development of property regimes across time?" and concluding that all of the following played a role in
the American development of waste doctrine: economic analysis, republican political culture, and
"the belief that European settlers were under a natural obligation to subdue the American wilderness and make it a fruitful, agrarian landscape").
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The first contribution to understanding property's appropriate
boundaries is the recognition that there is no "outside," or "opposite"
of property. The question is better framed not as "whether property,"
but "what kind of property," and "in whom?" This recognition dissolves the property/nonproperty opposition favored by some critics of
property regimes and inadvertently reinforced by institutional essentialists with a nondynamic view of property rules.
The second contribution is to highlight a set of considerations
that help to define reform and its proper limits. Extension or intensification of property rights is desirable, other things equal, when it can
make people freer in any of several ways: by helping them to resist
interpersonal domination; by expanding the set of viable alternatives
from which they choose in directing their life courses; by creating the
social preconditions for psychological attitudes supporting self-regard
and autonomous decision-making; and by otherwise maximizing people's capabilities relative to both their present levels and the levels
offered by alternative reforms. The mere form of property rights, however, does not guarantee any of these results. Depending on allocation
and various dimensions of context, the extension or intensification of
property rights may be neutral or negative in its effect on freedom.
The point is to keep in view the aim of promoting freedom understood
as capabilities, and not to confuse it with any particular institutional
instrument that has successfully promoted it in a particular context.
Property law exists to serve human values. Freedom is among the
greatest of these. People are free to the extent that they can turn their
full complement of potential into actual capabilities. The law of property sets the terms of social and economic cooperation, prescribing the
ways we may enlist one another in common projects. It is also how we
seize opportunities for new forms of productive activity. In choosing
among property regimes, we allocate capabilities in ways that make
people more or less free. The freedom-promoting approach to property seeks to understand the consequences of these choices and to
direct property law toward greater freedom.

